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INTRODUCTION 
Significance of the Problem 
Children's moral judgments are not based entirely on their cognitive 
abilities. Other dimensions of their development seem to be involved in 
determining their moral judgments. However, so much emphasis in research 
has been placed on the cognitive contribution to moral development that 
we are in danger of overlooking the affective contribution (Aronfreed, 
1976; Rybash & Roodin, 1978). Intelligence is necessary but not suffici­
ent for the development of moral maturity (Lickona, 1976). As suggested 
by Hoffman (1975), more research is needed which will help to clarify the 
relationship between the affective domain and moral decision-making. Sev­
eral theoretical approaches emphasize the importance of this relation­
ship . 
Simpson's (1976) holistic approach to moral development gives equal 
deference to thoughts, emotions and motivation. She describes her approach 
as a cognitive-affective-conative developmental theory. In general, she 
assumes that children must satisfy their emotional needs before they will 
be motivated to use their cognitive abilities in making mature moral 
judgments. 
Selman and Jaquette (1977) have formulated a theory of social cog­
nition which integrates clinical and developmental approaches to explain­
ing moral development. They focus on the relationship between social 
situational variables and individual social-cognitive capabilities as they 
jointly influence social and moral development. Selman (1971) emphasizes 
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both the stability of the child's capacity and the oscillation in the 
child's performance due to external and internal forces. This approach 
is based on the assumption that children can be expected to fluctuate in 
their moral development, and this fluctuation is partially explainable. 
Selman's research indicates that affect does influence children's per­
formance in social-moral situations. 
Kohlberg's (1969) theory of moral development emphasizes the cogni­
tive domain. However, he states that affective and cognitive development 
are parallel, not distinct realms, and they represent different aspects 
of the personality. Although Kohlberg theoretically acknowledges the in­
fluence of affect on moral judgment, he has not empirically investigated 
this influence. 
There are many unresolved issues in moral development research. 
Turiel (1966), doing research following Kohlberg's theory, stated that in­
dividuals frequently make judgments based on reasonings at more than one 
stage of moral development at a time. He describes this as stage mixture. 
Kohlberg (1976) asserts that even though people are rarely in only one 
stage at a time, the stages are hierarchically ordered, and development 
progresses in only one direction. Selman and Jaquette (1977) believe that 
although progress is basicly in one direction, individuals still may use 
lower level reasoning under particular conditions. 
Bandura and McDonald (1963) focused their research efforts on the 
identification of particular environmental conditions which influence per­
formance on moral development tasks. They found that certain social vari­
ables, such as the presence of models, can elicit either prosocial or 
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antisocial behavior. Milgram (1964) also found that models can influ­
ence people's obedience in carrying out antisocial tasks. 
Other social psychologists have investigated the influence of situa­
tional variables such as the affective state of the subject. Affect has 
been defined as the person's emotional response to internal or external 
circumstances (Selman & Jaquette, 1977). Berkowitz and Connor (1966) con­
clude from their research that when people are frustrated in striving for 
a goal, they are more likely to violate the norms of social responsibil­
ity. Conversely, they found that subjects who had a successful experi­
ence were more helpful in a moral behavior task, than those who had ex­
perienced frustration. Isen (1970) achieved similar results. The evi­
dence seems to indicate that affect influences moral behavior. 
Thus far, no studies have been reported which investigate the influ­
ence of children's situationally induced affective states on their moral 
judgment. Clarification of this influence may be useful for parents and 
teachers who are involved in guiding children. Adults are frequently in 
a position to nurture moral maturity in children. If affect influences 
judgment, then adults need to be perceptive of the children's emotional 
states during moral dilemmas. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of the study was to investigate induced affective states 
on the moral judgments of older children. Ten- and eleven-year-old boys 
and girls were asked to try to solve four puzzles, two were very easy and 
two were very difficult. The easy puzzle tasks were assumed to induce 
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the positive affect of success, and the difficult puzzles were assumed 
to induce the negative affect of frustration or failure. Following each 
puzzle task, the children were asked to respond to the Moral Advice Test 
(Carroll, 1974). The effect of affective states on moral judgment per­
formance was analyzed. It was predicted that subjects would respond dif­
ferently on the moral judgment measure after difficult tasks than after 
easy tasks. 
Null Hypothesis 
No differences exist between moral judgments after performing on 
easy tasks and moral judgments after performing on difficult tasks. 
Operational Definitions 
Older child or preadolescent; A child aged 10 or 11 years ; enrolled in 
fifth grade. 
Situationally induced affect; Success or failure in an experimental 
task. 
Success : Correctly completing a task in the time provided. 
Failure : Incompletion of a task in the time provided. 
Difficult task; A manual or crossword puzzle which most adults would not 
be able to solve in the time allocated. 
Easy task: A manual or crossword puzzle which most primary school chil­
dren would be able to solve in the time allocated. 
Mora1 iudgment; Score on the Moral Advice Test (Carroll, 1974). 
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REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Literature pertaining to moral development theories is reported in 
the first section of the review. Then, empirical research studies relat­
ing moral judgment to moral behavior and to role-taking are discussed, 
followed by a report of research on moral behavior and situational vari­
ables. Finally, moral judgment and situational variables are reviewed. 
Overview of Moral Development Theories 
Hartup (Note 1), in his presidential address to the American Psycho­
logical Association, Division 7, stated there is an unhealthy schism be­
tween the fields of social and developmental psychology. Developmental 
psychologists tend to emphasize the products (stages) of development, 
while social psychologists tend to emphasize the processes (socialization 
of an individual into society). 
Moral development is an example of an area frequently studied by de­
velopmental psychologists, while situationally induced affect is one as­
pect of socialization often studied by social psychologists. 
Moral development has been investigated in terms of moral emotions, 
moral behaviors, and moral reasoning (Hogan, 1972). 
Psychoanalytic theory 
Research on moral emotions, such as guilt, has stemmed predominantly 
from psychoanalytic theory. According to Lickona (1976), psychoanalysis 
assumes that man is biologically endowed with a motivation to maintain 
homeostasis. When the individual transgresses or deviates, an emotional 
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tension, such as guilt, is sensed. The person seeks to reduce this ten­
sion and as a result leams how to deal with moral dilemmas. Gilligan 
(1976) reviewed the psychoanalytic conception of the conscience, called 
the superego. He concluded that as children identify with their parents, 
they learn social standards. Soon children internalize these standards 
and values and no longer need to depend completely on others to control 
their behavior. The superego observes, criticizes and punishes the ego 
and id with guilt feelings when the individual disobeys social standards. 
Psychoanalytic theorists (Lickona, 1976) assume that both internal super­
ego control and social institutions are necessary to influence individ­
uals and keep them from destroying society. However, psychoanalysts did 
not include an explanation of how the superego develops through stages. 
In addition, psychoanalysis has limited its focus on moral emotions to 
guilt and ignored the influence of positive affect on moral judgment. 
Social-learning theory 
Relative to the psychoanalytic approach, the social-learning approach 
is less concerned with feelings surrounding morality, and more concerned 
with overt behaviors considered to be moral or immoral (Hogan, 1972). 
It is assumed that behavior is learned from the environment. Some of the 
specific areas include resistance to temptation, resistance to deviation, 
modeling, and reinforcement. The implication here is that morality is 
situation-specific. However, the problem is not that simple. Behavioral 
psychologists recognize the fact that even with the opportunity for re­
ward, people may still resist the temptation to behave in an immoral 
fashion (Goldiamond, 1968). Goldiamond (1968) refers to the learning of 
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moral behaviors as one that occurs in an anomalous manner; it does not 
follow the usual pattern of conditioning. He suggests that when people 
resist the temptation to gain immediate rewards, they are actually con­
sidering many consequences beyond the immediate one. They have remem­
bered the results of their past choices when tempted, and these will 
effect their present decision-making. Therefore, social-learning theo­
rists may recognize covert thinking in moral development, but probably 
not covert emotions. 
Hogan (1972) stated that one of the most amazing aspects about moral 
behavior is the extent to which people conform to social standards. Gen­
erally, human beings do what is expected of them. The universal thrust 
for social order stems from a value of conformity and a resistance to 
deviation. Perhaps the behavioral principle involved in conformity is 
avoidance behavior. Just as the pigeon learns to peck at a disc in time 
to avoid a shock, even though a reward for pecking is delayed, humans may 
be learning to behave in socially acceptable ways at appropriate times, 
even though gratification comes much later (Goldiamond, 1968). Modeling 
behavior has been investigated by Bandura and McDonald (1963). Their 
study supports the social learning theory in terms of the influence of the 
environment on moral behavior. In general, the social-learning approach 
highlights the oscillation of moral behaviors. 
Social-cognitive theory 
Selman and Jaquette (1977) advocate a social-cognition theoretical 
viewpoint which considers both the oscillation and the stability of chil­
dren's moral development and behavior. They believe that a psychologist 
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must be aware of both the developmental stability that children bring to 
situations and the oscillation in interpersonal dynamics due to internal 
and external forces on the children. 
The social-cognition theory is based on the assumption that children 
develop an interpersonal awareness termed social perspective taking, which 
provides a framework for moral concepts. Selman and Jaquette (1977) de­
scribed stages of social-cognitive development; 
Stage 0: Egocentric or undifferentiated perspectives 
Stage 1: Subjective or differentiated perspectives 
Stage 2 : Self-reflective or reciprocal perspectives 
Stage 3 : Mutual perspectives 
Stage 4: Societal perspectives 
Clinical and empirical research (Selman, 1971), support the position 
that most older children are beginning to enter Stage 2 (a self-reflective 
or reciprocal perspective) of social-perspective taking. At this stage, 
children can reflect on their own thoughts or feelings from the perspec­
tive of another person. They become aware of how they look to others, 
as well as what others think and feel. This capacity enables children to 
be empathie to other people's needs, and also increases their own self-
consciousness. Selman and Jaquette (1977) state that the child's stage 
of perspective-taking is fairly stable across situations. However, inter­
nal forces, such as affective state may lead to oscillation in moral be­
havior and judgment. This influence is seen most dramatically in emotion­
ally disturbed children. 
Holistic theory 
Simpson (1976) also acknowledges the involvement of the affective 
domain in moral development. Her holistic theory gives equal deference 
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to thoughts, emotions and motivation, as they contribute toward moral 
reasoning and behavior. Simpson regards moral development as one area of 
human competence in which people need to feel that they function well. 
According to this theory, basic emotional needs must be met in order for 
a person to be motivated to apply cognitive abilities in solving moral 
problems. Simpson refers to Maslow's hierarchy of needs to explain the 
holistic functioning of the personality. Maslow (1954, 1962) identified 
four fundamental needs; 1) survival, 2) security, 3) belongingness or 
affiliation, and 4) esteem. When these are satisfied, the individual is 
freed to use abilities to strive for self-actualization and mature 
morality. 
The holistic theory explains the functioning of the personality in 
general rather than in specific terms. Simpson believes that whether 
life's challenges stimulate or defeat children depends on their past ex­
periences and the satisfaction of their basic emotional needs. 
Cognitive-developmental theory 
A well-known orientation to moral development research is the 
cognitive-developmental theory, with an emphasis on moral judgment and 
reasoning. The major theorists have been Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohl-
berg. Piaget (1965), a genetic epistemologist, offered descriptions and 
explanations of the cognitive growth of children. His theory of cognitive 
development defines stages that describe how a child's perspective changes 
from concrete egocentricism to a broader, more abstract understanding 
of the world from many points of view. Since children are actively in­
volved with their environment, they develop new skills enabling 
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them to categorize, differentiate, and understand rules. Piaget observed 
children in their natural play situations, and made records of their 
actions and verbalizations. He asked direct questions, but also listened 
to the children's spontaneous remarks. He found differences in chil­
dren at different age levels, and he categorized their responses into 
stages. 
Piaget's theory emphasizes the characteristics of stages. Kohlberg 
(1969) summarized Piaget's ideas by focusing on four specific character­
istics: 1) the differences in the way children approach problems at 
different ages, 2) the invariant sequence of the way children think, 
3) the structured whole, or underlying organized thinking, which guide 
children in responding to tasks, and 4) the hierarchical integration of 
all previous stages, implying that higher stages are preferred over lower 
stages. 
Piaget (1965) also was concerned with the manner in which children 
mature in their understanding of rules. He observed two general stages of 
moral development; heteronomous morality and autonomous morality. The 
former stage is characterized by children's awesome obedience to adults, 
literal observation of rules, and primary concern with damage resulting 
from a wrong action. As the children's cognitive structures develop and 
as social interaction with peers instead of authorities increases auton­
omous morality emerges in middle childhood. A sense of justice and reci­
procity replaces unquestioned obedience. Mutual respect among equals and 
a recognition of the importance of motives predominate. Piaget felt that 
this stage refines with maturity, but is not actually replaced by different 
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stages. Overall, he emphasized that moral maturity depends on cognitive 
maturity. 
Kohlberg (1963, 1969) followed Piaget's approach to moral develop­
ment by integrating the characteristics of general cognitive stages with 
the specific area of morality. Similar to Piaget, Kohlberg was concerned 
with the structure of moral thought in addition to the content of moral 
decisions. By systematically presenting stories containing moral dilemmas 
to 10- to 16-year-old boys, and recording their responses, he was able to 
categorize reasonings into a developmental sequence. The result was a 
hierarchical stage theory which has since been subjected to a large amount 
of empirical research. The sequence involves three levels of morality, 
each with two specific stages. The six stages are as follows (Kohlberg, 
1963): 
Level I. Premoral level. 
Stage 1. Punishment and obedience orientation. 
Stage 2. Naive instrumental hedonism. 
Level II. Morality of conventional role-conformity. 
Stage 3. Good boy-girl morality, needs approval of others. 
Stage 4. Authority maintaining morality. 
Level III. Morality of self-accepted moral principles. 
Stage 5. Morality of contract and of democratically accepted 
law. 
Stage 6. Morality of individual principles of conscience. 
Each stage provides a frame of thought from which moral judgments 
are made, and in this sense, moral reasoning is generalizable across situ­
ations. However, Kohlberg recognizes that moral behavior is not directly 
related to moral reasoning so maturity of judgment does not guarantee 
socially acceptable conduct. 
Kohlberg has argued that children's orientations change frcm one 
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stage to another when they experience a disequilibrium resulting from an 
inability to assimilate events with existing cognitive structures. Upon 
exposure to higher reasoning, children reorganize their thinking into a 
more complex structure enabling them to order the world as they under­
stand it (1968). 
Kohlberg (1969) stated that universal trends in moral development 
have a cognitive base. However, many aspects of moral judgment do not 
have a cognitive base, but a social base. Therefore, social and cultural 
influences might effect moral judgment, but they might not be explain­
able in cognitive-developmental terms. 
Kohlberg's measure of morality is known as the Moral Judgment Scale 
which involves nine stories and specific questions designed to demonstrate 
moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1963). Despite the instrument's frequent use, 
it has not been standardized with published norms (Kurtines & Greif, 
1974). Also, the measure involves time-consuming, subjective scoring. 
Empirical Support for Moral Development Theory 
Kohlberg's theory of moral development has stimulated extensive 
research. His initial investigation was his dissertation research 
(1958). In that study Kohlberg interviewed 72 10- to 16-year-old 
boys. Kohlberg asked the subjects to verbally respond to nine moral 
dilemmas, each involving two values in conflict. Then he examined 
their responses. As a result of his subjective analysis, he identi­
fied six developmental types of value orientations: 
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1) Obedience and punishment 
2) Naively egoistic 
3) Good boy 
4) Authority and social-order maintaining 
5) Contractual legalistic 
6) Conscience or principles 
Kohlberg (1969) concluded that the types were a hierarchical devel­
opmental sequence of stages. Based on this initial study, Kohlberg devel­
oped the Moral Judgment Scale, which has been used extensively in research 
in the past twenty years (Lickona, 1976). 
To provide empirical support for Kohlberg's conclusion that the 
stages are hierarchical. Rest, Turiel and Kohlberg (1969) hypothesized 
that: 
1) A subject would prefer reasonings above his own stage over 
reasonings of lower stages; 
2) Stages of thinking above a subject's own stage are increas­
ingly more difficult to understand; and 
3) Exposure to reasoning of one stage above the subject's own 
stage would result in more assimilation than exposure to the 
stages two above or one below. 
The 45 subjects in this study included 11 males and 11 females in 
the fifth grade, and 12 males and 11 females in the eighth grade. 
All subjects were pretested on a partial version of the Moral Judg­
ment Scale (five dilemmas were presented instead of nine). Then subjects 
were exposed to a series of moral arguments for solving dilemmas that were 
at three different stages in relation to the subject's dominant stage: 
one below, one above and two above. The subjects then evaluated and re­
capitulated the advice, and also gave their own advice for the situa­
tions. 
Rest et al. (1969) found statistical support for their first hypoth­
esis by analyzing the preferences in terms of a binomial distribution, 
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and calculating the deviations from the normal approximation. Specific 
numerical results of the test were not given. The second hypothesis was 
tested by examining the subjects' attempts at recapitulating advice state­
ments. They found that the accuracy of the recapitulations decreased as 
the stage level increased (chi-square goodness of fit test was employed 
and the difference in accuracy was reported to be highly significant, 
although no numerical results were given). The third hypothesis was 
tested by comparing stage usage in the pretest interview with stage usage 
in the subject's own advice. 
The comparison of stage usage shows a definite increase in use of 
reasoning one stage beyond the subject's original reasoning, no increase 
in reasoning two stages beyond, and a slight increase in reasoning one 
stage below (no statistical tests were reported). In summary, the results 
of this study give some evidence that preadolescents prefer concepts that 
are above their current predominant stage to those concepts that are be­
low, they find concepts increasingly difficult at stages higher than 
their own, and they assimilate thinking that is just one stage beyond 
more readily than reasoning either one stage below or two stages beyond 
their own current level. 
Kohlberg's approach to studying moral development has been reviewed 
and critiqued. Kurtines and Greif (1974) have examined this model and 
have identified some major problems. In general, the theory's primary 
measurement device, the Moral Judgment Scale, lacks standardized adminis­
tration procedures, has a variable and complex scoring scheme, and no re­
ported estimates of reliability (temporal stability and internal consis­
tency) or standard error of measurement. In addition, the validity of 
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the measure is questionable, since there is an unclear relationship be­
tween moral judgment and moral behavior. Kurtines and Greif concluded 
that it is possible that the stages do reflect actual moral development, 
but the Moral Judgment Scale does not seem to be an acceptable measuring 
device. 
Rest (1976) has responded to such criticism of the research on moral 
judgment by providing an alternative method of developmental assessment. 
Rest's measure is based on the assumption that people make judgments about 
the important issues in moral dilemmas (Rest, Cooper, Coder, Masanz, & 
Anderson, 1974). Statements were written which represent thinking at the 
various stages of moral development identified by Kohlberg. Subjects 
are given the task of reading moral dilemmas and selecting which issues 
are the most important to consider when trying to solve the dilemmas. 
Rest et al. (1974) hypothesized that statements representing principled 
thinking (Stages 5 and 6) would be selected more often by subjects sup­
posed to be developmentally more advanced. In this study, 160 students 
made up the major sample: 40 ninth-grade subjects, 20 males, 20 females; 
40 twelfth-grade subjects, 20 males, 20 females; 40 juniors and seniors in 
college, nearly equal numbers of males and females; and 40 male graduate 
students majoring in religion or moral philosophy. Additional minor sam­
ples were involved but they were smaller and less balanced in terms of sex. 
The instrument developed by Rest is the Defining Issues Test (DIT). 
It consists of six moral dilemmas, each followed by twelve statements 
of issues to consider in the particular dilemma. The subjects were asked 
to rate and rank the statements in terms of importance. The ranking data 
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seemed to be more reliable than the rating data, so the results were com­
piled by giving weights of 4, 3, 2, and 1 to the issues ranked first, 
second, third, and fourth, respectively. The weights attributed to the 
principled issues over all six stories were summed for a score which 
varied from 0 to 95. The score (designated P) was interpreted as the rel­
ative importance a subject gives to principled issues when making moral 
judgments. 
The Defining Issues Test was checked for reliability with a test-re-
test on 28 ninth-grade children. The resulting Pearson correlation was 
.81. To compare the results of the different student groups. Rest et al. 
(1974) reported the average percentage of ranks given to the issues of 
each stage, for all groups, and then performed a one-way analysis of vari­
ance between groups on the P score. The main effect was highly signifi­
cant (F = 48.5, £ < .01).^ The group assumed to be more advanced (graduate 
students) attributed much more importance to higher stage statements than 
the other groups. Thus the DIT P score clearly differentiated the four 
criterion groups. 
Additional minor studies were reported relating moral judgment to 
Kohlberg's scale, age, and comprehension of social-moral concepts; all 
correlations were in the 60s. The DIT also related .35 (£ < .01) to the 
Differential Ability Test, which is an IQ test (Cooper, 1972). 
The DIT has the advantages of good test-retest reliability, standard­
ized administration procedures, objective scoring, minimal variance due 
to differences in verbal expressivity, and is quick to score. 
After many researchers began to use the DIT in moral judgment 
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research. Rest, Davison and Robbins (1978) summarized the findings of 
all these studies to date. Over 50 researchers had collected DIT data on 
5,714 subjects in 136 different samples from a variety of backgrounds and 
areas of the country. Subjects were combined into student groups (junior 
high, senior high, college, graduate students) and the P scores were 
averaged. Additional adult samples were also analyzed. In general, P 
scores averaged in the 20s, 30s, 40s and 50s, respectively. One-way 
analysis of variance results for the four groups indicated an extremely 
high trend (F(3,2905) - 604.9, £< .0001). Rest et al. (1978) concluded 
that the DIT effectively discriminated among the four age groups. 
Rest's article also included a report and discussion of results of 
longitudinal studies involving the DIT. In summary, analyses of individ­
ual subjects over time indicated a decrease in lower stages of moral 
thinking and an increase in higher stages. 
Rest et al. (1978) concluded that these results provide support for 
Kohlberg's model of moral development. 
Kohlberg's investigations (1958), 1963, 1968) appear to have been 
useful for exploring the various types of thinking involved in moral judg­
ment. The products have been the theory of the six hierarchical stages 
as well as numerous examples of reasonings. Rest has extended this area 
of research by developing a reliable, standardized measure of moral de­
velopment, which was based on Kohlberg's theory, and which made use of 
the examples of reasonings in issue statements. Therefore, there is some 
evidence to suggest that moral judgment does exist in preadolescence, and 
that its development can be measured. However, it is not clear that 
moral judgment can be discriminated from intelligence. 
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Carroll (1974), following Rest's (1976) lead in developing instru­
ments of moral judgment, developed a measure which permitted empirical 
testing of Kohlberg's moral development theory. The device is known as 
the Moral Advice Test. It was Carroll's objective to create a similar 
instrument which would be particularly appropriate for use with preadoles-
cents. 
Carroll decided to use the well-tried format of presenting moral 
dilemma stories. He revised three stories from Kohlberg's interviews and 
created one new story. After doing a pilot test on 10-, 12- and 14-year-
old subjects, he edited the stories to balance the vocabulary. The new 
stories were then administered to seventh-grade students to check for com­
prehension. The stories were revised again. Then advice statements were 
selected or constructed to represent Kohlberg's stages of moral judgment; 
1, 2, 3, 4 and P. Cooper (1972), Kohlberg (1969), and Carroll agree that 
stages 5 and 6 can be grouped together as a principled (P) stage. The 
advice statements were tested on 11- to 15-year-old subjects and then 
edited to balance for vocabulary and syntax. Statements were limited to 
two or three sentences. 
Carroll tried a variety of modes of presenting the instrument in pilot 
tests. He concluded that ninth-grade students (or older) appear to be 
capable of reading the stories and rating the advice statements on paper, 
without assistance. However, younger adolescents often needed assistance 
with the stories. Carroll found that recording the stories and present­
ing them while the subjects read along was effective in limiting the ef­
fect of differences in reading ability. 
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Finally, Carroll interviewed individual pilot subjects to check for 
their comprehension of the stories and procedures, and their reasons for 
rating the advice statements. He concluded that the instrument was in­
teresting and understandable to subjects as young as 10 years old. 
After completing the pilot tests, Carroll collected data on 271 sub­
jects in the seventh, ninth and eleventh grades of a middle-class commu­
nity. The Moral Advice Test was administered as a paper-and-pencil test 
to groups of subjects. Subjects were asked to respond in three ways: 
1) indicate whether they accept, tend to accept, tend to reject, or reject 
each advice statement; 2) indicate what age of person probably made each 
advice statement: elementary or preschool child, junior or senior high 
school student, or adult; and 3) indicate which key words in each advice 
statement influenced them, in forming their opinions. Data were not ana­
lyzed on this third form of response. 
The results of the rejection/acceptance rating scale indicated 
that there was a developmental trend toward greater consistency and in­
tensity of rejection of lower stage (1, 2, 3) advice statements. Older 
subjects rejected lower stage statements more often than younger sub­
jects. The differences in responding were highly significant (£ < .01). 
The higher stage advice statements (P) were accepted by most subjects 
regardless of age or verbal ability. Internal consistency reliabili­
ties were in the high .70s for the lower stage scales. 
The second form of response (indicating age of person making each 
statement) minimally distinguished age groups when analyzed alone. 
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However, when age assignment ratings were combined with rejection/accep­
tance ratings the strongest discrimination of age groups was produced. 
This finding served as a test of construct validity. 
Therefore, preadolescent and early adolescent subjects were differ­
entiated by rejection/acceptance ratings of lower stage reasonings, in 
terms of consistency and intensity. Carroll concluded that the Moral Ad­
vice Test is reliable, and it may be of use in future studies with pre-
adolescents, especially if the test is administered orally, and if the 
subjects are asked to give rejection/acceptance ratings alone. 
Moral Judgment and Moral Behavior 
Moral judgment has been investigated in terms of its relationship to 
a variety of dimensions of personality. Harris, Mussen, and Rutherford 
(1976) focused on children's moral judgment, intelligence, moral conduct, 
honesty, reputation, self-confidence, and security in social relationships 
with peers. Their study involved 33 fifth-grade boys (X age = 10.5 
years), who participated in four testing sessions. In the first session, 
the boys responded to a sociometric questionnaire in which they nominated 
classmates on items dealing with conformity to rules, honesty, generosity 
and helpfulness. The responses were intercorrelated and factor analyzed. 
These analyses yielded two factors: honesty and altruism. Scores for 
these factors were derived for each subject by selecting the items that 
had the highest loading on each of these factors and summing the standard 
scores for these items. The children also responded to a self-concept 
scale containing items in four categories; adjustment to parents. 
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adjustment to peers, school adjustment, self-confidence. In the second 
testing session, two intelligence tests were given to the children in 
groups. The researchers made duplicates of the children's responses. 
During a third session the children were asked to help score their own 
tests, thus providing an opportunity for cheating. Their moral conduct 
scores, therefore, consisted of comparisons of the original responses with 
the corrected tests. Intelligence was assessed by the actual intelligence 
tests. The fourth testing session involved individual administration of 
Kohlberg's nine-story Moral Judgment Scale. 
The correlation between moral judgment and intelligence was .52 
(£ < .01), and the correlation between moral judgment and honesty was 
.45 (£ < .05). Scores on the altruism factor correlated .41 (£ < .05) 
with moral judgment. Moral judgment correlated with self-confidence 
in peer relationships at .45 (£ < .05). Several other results were 
given that involved statistically partialling out intelligence. How­
ever, this technique is no longer acceptable, so those results will not 
be reported here (Note 2). 
Sullivan, McCullough and Stager (1970) also were concerned with the 
relationship between moral judgment and moral behavior. They worked on 
the assumption that ego strength was an essential dimension of moral 
character and may be a bridge between moral judgment and behavior. One 
aspect of their study involved assessing the moral judgment and ego 
development of 120 12-, 14-, and 17-year-old children (60 males and 60 
females). Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Scale, using all nine dilemmas, was 
22 
administered to the group. The ego development measure, developed by 
Loevinger and Wessler (Note 3), was administered to the group on a 
separate day. This measure consisted of 36 stems to be completed with 
words to form single sentences. The responses to the sentence com­
pletion test were judged and assigned to the stages of ego development: 
symbiotic, impulse ridden, opportunistic, conformist, conscientious, 
autonomous, and integrated. From the judged responses, a single rating 
was assigned which reflected the distribution of item ratings. The 
subjects' moral judgment correlated with ego development at .40. This 
result was interpreted by Sullivan et al. (1970) to be an indication 
that the constant capacity of the ego to make decisions accounts for 
consistencies in moral judgments and moral behaviors. 
Moral Judgment and Role-taking Skills 
Selman and Jaquette (1977) also focused on the consistency in the 
child's moral development. In their theory of social cognition, they de­
scribed the capacity to role-take as stable, although oscillation in be­
haviors and judgments occur due to internal and external situational 
variables. Selman (1971) has offered empirical support for this theory 
in his study which explored the relationship between role-taking ability 
and moral reasoning. Role-taking is defined as the ability to understand 
the interaction between the self and another as seen through the other's 
eyes. The subjects were 60 middle-class children age 8, 9, and 10 (30 
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males and 30 females). Moral judgment was measured by Kohlberg's scale, 
in individual interviews. Role-taking was measured by two instruments 
developed by Flavell (1968). One role-taking task involved the child try­
ing to outguess a peer in choosing money from two boxes. Responses and 
reasons were analyzed and scored at one of three qualitatively different 
levels: 1) lack of awareness of another's motives, 2) awareness of the 
existence of motives but unaware of the relevance of another's motives, 
and 3) awareness of importance of another's motives. The second role-
taking task involved telling a story with a series of pictures. When 
specific pictures were removed, the child was asked to retell the story 
as a peer would who had not heard the first story. Since the removed 
pictures eliminated the segment of the story involving a motive, the task 
was to see if the child could change the story appropriately. Again, re­
sponses were analyzed and scored into three levels of role-taking. How­
ever, for data analysis, the focus was on scores in Categories 2 and 3, 
to emphasize the key difference between reciprocal and nonreciprocal role-
taking. 
The results were of a categorical (ordinal) nature, so the data were 
analyzed nonparametrically. The two role-taking tasks were significantly 
associated (9^? = 18.055, £< .01). Moral judgment was significantly asso-
2 
ciated with scores on both of the role-taking tasks (]< = 18.921, £ < .01; 
= 13.203, £ < .01). Most of the children tended to use Stage 2 moral 
judgment reasoning, which is predominantly a concern for one's own needs. 
Selman concluded that when older children mature in their moral judgment 
\ 
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from Stage 2 to Stage 3 (concern for others' needs and approval) that 
this increase is due in part to an increase in reciprocal role-taking 
(1971). 
Moir (1974) investigated the same relationship in his study involv­
ing 40 11-year-old girls. He individually administered Kohlberg's moral 
judgment measure with all nine dilemmas, and administered three differ­
ent role-taking tasks. The three tasks involved visual role-taking, 
perception of another's motives in manipulating objects, and perception 
of another's feelings in interpersonal relationships. Responses were 
analyzed and scored as in the Selman (1971) study. Moir found that 
most of the girls scored at Stage 2 (33%) or Stage 3 (27%) of moral 
reasoning. So, he concluded that conventional morality was just begin­
ning to emerge. The subject's overall role-taking scores correlated 
with moral judgment at .71 (£ < .005). The individual role-taking tasks 
differed in their correlations with moral judgment. Moir interpreted 
his findings to mean that the emergence of conventional moral thinking 
is gradual, fluctuating, and consisting of a sequence of many small 
transitions. He did not discuss the results in terms of the influence 
of situational variables. 
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Moral Behavior and Situational Variables 
Moral judgment seems to be related to moral behavior (Harris, Mussen 
& Rutherford, 1976), ego development (Sullivan, McCullough & Stager, 
1970) and role-taking skills (Selman, 1971; Moir, 1974). Thus, the in­
creasing ego-strength and capacity for mature role-taking may account for 
some of the stability in older children's moral maturity. However, older 
children do fluctuate between moral Stages 2 and 3, and these are strik­
ingly different stages. Since the difference between these two stages in­
volves a concern for others' needs, this contrast in stages of judgment 
seems to parallel the contrast in nonaltruistic vs. altruistic moral be­
haviors. If situationally induced affect has an influence on moral beha­
vior, then perhaps it also influences moral judgment at the point of 
transition from Stage 2 to Stage 3. 
Berkowitz and Connor (1966) investigated the influence of situation-
ally induced affect of adults' willingness to help other people. One 
hundred and eight male college students volunteered in this study. Only 
one aspect of the study will be reported here. The subjects were divided 
into two experimental groups and one control group. Those in the first 
group were asked to individually solve a jigsaw puzzle which was so diffi­
cult that they each met with failure. The second group of subjects were 
asked to solve an easy jigsaw puzzle which each subject succeeded in 
doing. The control group waited for a similar time period. Then each 
subject was involved in an envelope-making task, in which they were led 
to believe that another person would benefit by the quantity of their 
production. The results indicated that previous experience with a puzzle 
had a significant effect on the subject's production (F = 7.1, £< .01),^ 
and the authors interpreted this to mean that the previous successful ex­
perience increased the subjects' willingness to help other people, while 
the previous frustrating experience tended to reduce this willingness. 
Isen (1970) also investigated the effects of success or failure on 
altruism. She formulated the warm glow of success hypothesis, which sum­
marized her expectation that those who had succeeded on a task would be 
more helpful and generous to a stranger than those who had not succeeded. 
In the first of three studies reported, Isen randomly assigned 14 male 
and female school teachers to two groups. Subjects were met individually, 
and given a series of perceptual-motor and creativity tasks. Upon com­
pletion, the subjects were given a dollar in change, and told that they 
had performed either extremely well or extremely poorly. Then the exper­
imenter left the room and a confederate entered carrying a money collec­
tion can. The can had a sign saying "junior high air-conditioning fund". 
The confederate explained about the fund, then left. The amount of money 
donated was the dependent measure of generosity. The success subjects 
donated significantly more than failure subjects (t = 1.99, £< .05).^ 
The second of three studies involved 12 different teachers in a similar 
setting. Half the subjects experienced success and half experienced 
failure. Then, a confederate entered the room carrying an armload of 
items that began to spill. The amount of help offered was the dependent 
measure of helpfulness. The success subjects were more helpful than those 
who had failed (t = 1.91, £ < .05).^ Similar findings occurred in the 
third study, involving college students. 
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Later, Isen was joined by two other investigators (Isen, Horn, & 
Rosenhan, 1973) in a series of experiments involving older children. In 
the first of three studies, 75 fourth-grade children were seen individ­
ually. Each child was given 25 pennies for participating, and then was 
given a chance to play a marble game alone. The game was rigged to allow 
the child to experience success, failure or no score, depending on 
which group he/she had been assigned. When the experimenter returned to 
discuss the toy, another experimenter entered with a contribution can 
bearing a sign saying "toy fund for poor children" and then left. For a 
minute, the child was alone and had the opportunity to contribute. The 
amounts contributed were analyzed nonparametrically, and the experience of 
success or failure significantly effected the amount contributed (H = 9.77, 
£< .025).^ In the second of three studies, it was hypothesized that the 
generosity of children would be influenced by whether the children failed 
the task privately or in the company of an adult. In this study 60 third-
grade children were tested individually. Each child was told from the 
beginning that he/she could contribute money to a toy fund, then play 
with the (rigged) marble toy alone. When the child completed the game, 
the experimenter returned, discussed the game, and left the child alone 
which gave the child a chance to contribute. Children experiencing suc­
cess contributed significantly more than children in the control group 
(U = 133, £ < .05),1 but not more than children experiencing failure. In 
the third study, the effects of failure only were studied. Sixty fourth-
grade children were tested individually in a situation similar to the 
previous studies, however, the toy fund can was not introduced at the 
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beginning. Children failed the game either in the presence of the ex­
perimenter or in private, or played the game with no score. As in the 
second study, the toy fund can was presented, and the child was left alone 
with it. Children with public failure experiences contributed much more 
than those with private failure experiences = 3.37, £< .005).^ In 
conclusion, Isen et al. (1973) demonstrated that success leads to greater 
generosity in children and that public failure leads to greater generos­
ity than private failure. Isen et al. suggested that perhaps the latter 
finding occurred because the children who failed publicly may have wanted 
to improve their image in the experimenter's eyes. 
Moore, Underwood and Rosenhan (1973) investigated the influence of 
affect on moral behavior in a more direct manner. Instead of presenting 
the subjects with tasks which would result in success or failure, they 
asked the subjects to think of happy or sad things. Forty-two girls and 
boys, between seven and eight years of age, were randomly assigned to one 
of three groups (happy, sad, control). Children were tested individually 
with an experimenter who indicated that the task was a hearing test. Each 
child received 25 pennies for participating, and was told that not all 
children could participate. However, anyone could contribute to a fund to 
share the money with those children who did not participate. After a 
hearing test the child was told to think of happy or sad things, was asked 
to count, or sat quietly for 30 seconds. Then the child was left alone 
for 90 seconds, and given an opportunity to privately contribute. The 
amount of pennies contributed was the measure of altruism. The affective 
state main effect was significant (F = 4.71, £ < .025).^ It seems that 
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even a transient experience of suggested positive affect makes a child 
more generous. 
In summary, affect which is directly induced by suggestion or induced 
by experience with difficult or easy tasks seems to influence moral beha­
vior in terms of generosity or altruism. 
Moral Judgment and Situational Variables 
Social learning theorists challenge stage developmentalists because 
they assume that moral responses vary according to the unfolding of geneti­
cally programmed response predispositions (Bandura & McDonald, 1963). In­
stead, social learning theorists assume that children learn social-moral 
responses from the environment, and these responses can be influenced by 
models and reinforcers. Bandura and McDonald (1963) tested this assump­
tion in their study involving 155 children aged 5 to 11 years. The sub­
jects were individually pretested with pairs of stories similar to those 
designed by Piaget (1965). In each pair of stories, one story described a 
well-intentioned act with a large amount of damage done, and one story de­
scribed a character with a selfish motive resulting in minimal damage. 
In answer to the question "Who did the naughtier thing?", a child's orig­
inal moral orientation (heteronomous vs. autonomous) was detected. Then 
the experimenters divided the children into groups. In the experimental 
groups some children discussed more stories with a model who verbalized re­
sponses opposite of what the child originally offered. In other groups, 
the children were reinforced for any responses opposite to their original 
responses. All children were posttested with more stories. Older 
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children tended to offer more autonomous responses in the whole experi­
ment as Piaget had described (F = 4.84, < .01).^ The effect of the dif-
1 
ferent experimental conditions was significant (F = 3.24, £< .05). Fur­
ther analyses indicated that the children exposed to models gave signifi­
cantly more moral responses that were different from their original re­
sponses, than the control group. Reinforcement was not as effective as 
models in altering the children's moral responses. 
Arbuthnot and Andrasik (1973) also examined the influence of situa­
tional variables on moral judgment. Eighty male college students partici­
pated as subjects in this study. There were two levels each of environ­
mental conditions (comfortable room vs. hot, crowded room), model (low vs. 
high moral reasoning), and individuation (individuated vs. deindividuated). 
All subjects were assessed using Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Scale, before 
and after all experimental manipulations. In the individuated conditions, 
subjects were made to feel responsible and personally involved by being 
introduced to others in the experiment, and by putting their names on in­
struments. Deindividuated subjects were made to feel anonymous by wear­
ing waist-length white hoods and meeting no one personally. After indi­
vidual moral judgment assessments on three dilemmas, subjects were gath­
ered in groups of 10 to discuss another dilemma in the different environ­
mental conditions, with different models present, and under different in­
dividuation conditions. Then subjects responded individually to the same 
dilemma on paper. The data were subjected to analysis of variance. The 
results showed that subjects in the deindividuation condition scored lower 
in moral judgment than in the individuation condition (E, < .01; = 3.90;^ 
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= 4.29; F and ^  not reported). Also, subjects tended to increase 
in moral maturity across trials. Modeling and physical environmental 
conditions were not significant, nor were their interactions. However, 
the interaction of deindividuation and modeling was of interest. 
Subjects with a high moral model tended to give higher moral judgments 
when individuated than when deindividuated. Apparently, when a person is 
held responsible for his/her moral judgments, highly moral models have a 
positive influence, but when not held accountable, the person reacts in 
the opposite direction. 
Turiel (1966) investigated the influence of various stages of moral 
reasoning on preadolescent boys. His research was not based on social-
learning assumptions of the influence of the environment, but rather on 
the assumption that passing from one stage to the next involves the inte­
gration of previous stages. Therefore, people learn more when they are 
exposed to reasoning at one stage above rather than one stage below their 
own. Forty-four subjects were pretested by Kohlberg's measure, and then 
distributed among three experimental groups and one control group. In the 
treatments, two weeks later, subjects were exposed to arguments in moral 
discussions that represented moral reasoning at stages one above, one be­
low or two above their original level. Control subjects received no 
treatment. A week later, all subjects were posttested on Kohlberg's 
scale, again. The results indicated that the influence of reasoning one 
stage above the original responses was significantly greater than that of 
reasoning two stages above = 3.55, £< .005),^ and somewhat greater 
than that of reasoning one stage below (t = 1.43, £ < .10).^ Turiel 
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concluded that these results provided empirical support for Kohlberg's 
assumption of the hierarchical integration of stages. 
Arbuthnot (1975) also studied the influence of various stages of 
moral reasoning, but he involved college students instead of preadoles-
cents. Ninety-six males and females participated in this study. They 
were pretested on Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Scale, then distributed into 
control and experimental groups. For the treatment, subjects met in pairs 
and were asked to role-play a moral dilemma and try to convince each 
other of their own positions. All subjects were posttested on a portion 
of Kohlberg's measure immediately afterwards. All but one of the control 
groups were also assessed one week later. Subjects paired with opponents 
having more mature reasonings compared to control subjects increased sig­
nificantly (£ < .001), and this increase also was present after one week 
(F = 6.72, £< .02).^ However, Arbuthnot's study did not replicate 
Turiel's (1966) finding that subjects showed the largest increase when 
presented with arguments just one stage higher than their own. The in­
consistency in the findings may be due to the age differences in subjects. 
It would appear that moral judgment responses may be altered, some­
what, by exposure to different reasoning from older models and peers, and 
by deindividuating circumstances. 
In summary, several theories of moral development indicate that moral 
judgments may be influenced by affect. While the cognitive-developmental 
theory of moral judgment has been supported by empirical research, it is 
not clear how moral judgment relates to moral behavior. Moral behavior 
has been shown to be altered by situationally induced affect. Moral 
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judgment has been shovm to be altered by a few situational variables, 
however, no research has been reported which indicates the influence of 
situationally induced affect. 
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FOOTNOTE 
1. Degrees of freédom (df) were not included in the Review of Liter­
ature when they were not reported in the original reference. 
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METHODOLOGY 
The focus of the research was on the effect of affective states on 
moral judgment performance in older children. The general research de­
sign was a Graeco-Latin Square design (Kirk, 1968), to control for the 
nuisance variables of groups of subjects, order of testing sessions, and 
versions of the Moral Advice Test (Carroll, 1974). The independent vari­
able of interest was different puzzle tasks, while the dependent variable 
was moral judgments made after performing on puzzle tasks. 
Subjects 
The subjects involved in the study were 40 fifth-grade children (14 
boys, 26 girls). They ranged in age from 10 years, 7 months to 11 years, 
9 months, with an X of 11 years, 0 months. All subjects were Cau­
casian, and residents of two middle-class communities in the midwestern 
United States. Names of subjects were obtained from four sources: 4-H 
club membership lists, parochial school class lists, students known to a 
former public school teacher, and children of parents acquainted with the 
experimenter. All the children were unfamiliar to the experimenter. 
Instruments 
The instruments for the study included the equipment needed to estab­
lish tasks for inducing positive and negative affect and a test for meas­
uring moral judgment. 
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Tasks 
In order to situationally induce positive and negative affect, equip­
ment was needed which would provide the children with both successful and 
frustrating experiences. It was decided that difficult and easy tasks 
could provide such experiences. The criteria for selecting appropriate 
tasks included the following considerations; 
1) The tasks should be interesting to older children. 
2) The tasks should be able to be administered in a few minutes. 
3) The tasks should be similar in appearance so that degree of dif­
ficulty would not be immediately obvious. 
4) There should be more than one opportunity for frustration to 
occur and more than one opportunity for success to occur. 
5) The tasks should be designed to require different dimensions of 
intelligence, because not all children perform equally well in 
all dimensions (Wechsler, 1974). 
Based on these considerations, four puzzles were selected for the 
tasks. Two were puzzles which required verbal comprehension (crossword 
puzzles), and two required nonverbal manipulation of materials (manual 
puzzles). There was one difficult and one easy puzzle of each type of 
puzzle. 
Manual puzzles Both of the manual puzzles are peg form-board 
type puzzles. Each has a base constructed out of sturdy, translucent 
plastic, which measures 9" by 12" by Each base has four rows of pegs 
on which six forms are positioned. The pegs and forms are made of the 
same type of plastic as the base. The pegs are %" wide cylinders, 
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standing %" high off the base. There are three pegs for the three holes 
in each form. Each puzzle has six forms, including three circles measur­
ing 3%" in diameter by %" deep, and three triangles measuring 4" on each 
side by %" deep. For the easier puzzle, all the triangles fit onto all 
the sets of pegs for triangles, in any position; and all the circles fit 
onto all the sets of pegs for circles, in any position. The difficult 
puzzle appears identical to the simple puzzle when all the pieces are in 
place. The circle forms are the same shape and size as those of the easy 
puzzle, however, the triangle forms are not quite equilateral. The three 
pegs and holes for each form are arranged in slightly askew formats, so 
that there is only one way to fit each form onto the puzzle base (Appen­
dix A). 
Doak (1968) originally developed these manual puzzles for her re­
search. She reported that the difficult puzzle usually takes adults three 
to five minutes to complete, while the easy puzzle usually takes children 
less than a minute to complete. 
When the puzzles are administered, the experimenter places one of the 
puzzles on a table in front of the subject. All the pieces are in place 
on the puzzle base. The experimenter removes the pieces off the base and 
jumbles them up on the table, near the base and says: 
Now, it's time for a puzzle. It's your job to put this puzzle 
back together in four minutes. This puzzle can be solved. It 
is possible. Go ahead and do the best you can. 
Then the experimenter sets the timer for four minutes. 
When the child completes the puzzle or when the four minutes are up, 
the experimenter removes the equipment from the table. After the testing 
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session is over, the experimenter records whether or not the child com­
pletes the puzzle. 
Crossword puzzles Both the difficult and easy crossword puzzles 
have eight words. The easy crossword puzzle was developed by the experi­
menter. It is assumed that if the words in the puzzle are familiar to 
children that it is an easy puzzle. Seven of the words are among the 500 
words occurring most frequently in the English language (Thomdike & 
Lorge, 1952), and also found to be recognized with high frequency by pri­
mary school children (Johnson, Smith, & Jensen, 1972). The eighth word 
is assumed to be simple ("ss" = the sound a snake makes). The experi­
menter developed the clues. The puzzle is shown in Appendix B. 
The difficult crossword puzzle is derived from a portion of a New 
York Times crossword puzzle, entitled "Remark from Mark", by Caroline G. 
Fitzgerald, edited by Eugene T. Maleska. It was published in the Pes 
Moines Sunday Register in April, 1979. It is shown in its entirety in 
Appendix C. Just one portion of the puzzle was selected, and two of the 
words were shortened ("aprilithisis" to "April", and "roamer" to "roam"), 
so that the length of the words in the two puzzles would be comparable. 
The clues for six of the words are the same as those appearing in the pub­
lished puzzle. The experimenter developed the clues for the shortened 
words. The puzzle used in the study is shown in Appendix D. 
The crossword puzzles were subjected to a pilot study to determine 
the length of time required to complete the puzzles. The easy crossword 
puzzle was administered to a class of 18 third-grade children. All but 
one child successfully completed the puzzle in three minutes or less. 
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The difficult crossword puzzle was given to 15 college-educated adults. 
Nine adults were unable to complete the puzzle in four minutes. All 15 
adults agreed the puzzle would be challenging for most fifth-grade chil­
dren. 
As a result of pilot tests, it was decided that the two crossword 
puzzles differentiated enough in difficulty levels so that most older 
children could probably complete the easy puzzle, and probably not com­
plete the difficult puzzle in four minutes. Therefore, no further work 
was done on the development of the puzzles. 
When the puzzles are administered, the experimenter places one puzzle 
and a pencil on a table in front of the subject and says: 
Now, it's time for a puzzle. It's your job to complete this 
puzzle in four minutes. This puzzle can be solved. It is pos­
sible. Go ahead and do the best you can. 
Then the experimenter sets the timer for four minutes. 
When the child completes the puzzle or when the four minutes are up, 
the experimenter removes the paper and pencil from the table. After the 
testing session is over and the subject is gone, the experimenter records 
whether or not the child completes the puzzle. 
Moral Advice Test 
The criteria for selection of the measure of moral judgment included 
the following considerations: 
1) The instrument should be based on Kohlberg's theory of the de­
velopment of moral judgment. 
2) The instrument should be interesting and understandable to 
older children. 
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3) The instrument should be able to be administered to children 
on an individual basis. 
4) The instrument should involve objective scoring. 
5) The instrument should have demonstrated reliability and validity. 
6) The instrument should be able to be divided into several test­
ing sessions to avoid subject fatigue. 
Carroll's (1974) Moral Advice Test was selected for the research 
(Appendix E). Carroll reported that the Moral Advice Test's reliability 
score is in the high .70s. The construct validity of the measure was 
demonstrated by combining age assignment ratings with rejection/acceptance 
ratings, and this strongly discriminated between different age groups 
(7th, 9th and 11th grades) . 
The present experimenter made revisions on the Moral Advice Test, to 
make the language sound more informal and concrete. Based on this cri­
teria the advice statements were edited in three ways: 1) contractions 
were used, 2) vague references to "this situation" were replaced with 
specific actions, and 3) some pronouns were replaced with story charac­
ters' names. The response choices were edited, also, to sound more infor­
mal. Carroll's choices were: 
1) accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for 
making this important decision. 
2) 1 tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good 
enough reasons for making this important decision. 
3) I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be 
good enough reasons for making this important decision. 
4) 2 reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
The present experimenter changed these choices to; 
1) Good. They are good enough reasons for making this 
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important decision. 
2) Pretty Good. They seem to be good enough reasons for 
making this important decision. 
3) Pretty Bad. They do not seem to be good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
4) Bad. They are not good enough reasons for making this 
important decision. 
The choices are written on a 4" x 12" card in large capital letters 
(Appendix F). The key words (GOOD, etc.) are written on colored paper 
adhered to the card. The colors range in hues from orange to pale yellow, 
corresponding to the range of choices from GOOD to BAD. Four dozen 1" 
square colored chips match the four colors on the card. The chips are 
kept in four 4" x 4" plastic containers and arranged on the table behind 
the card during testing sessions (Appendix G). 
The four moral stories are used as Carroll developed them. Each 
moral story is called a version of the Moral Advice Test. One version is 
used in each of four testing sessions. Each story is typed on paper which 
is adhered to an 8" x 12" card. In addition, the stories are recorded 
on cassette tapes, to standardize the presentation of the stories. The 
voice on the tapes was that of the present experimenter. Illustrations 
accompany each story. There are two pictures per story (Appendix H). The 
forty advice statements are written in large capital letters on 4" x 6" 
cards (Appendix I). Each testing session involves 10 advice statements. 
There are two statements for each of five stages of moral reasoning (1, 
2, 3, 4, and P), in each testing session. The order of presentation of 
the advice statements was balanced by Carroll, and this order was followed 
in the present study (Appendix J). 
The revised Moral Advice Test is administered, individually, in four 
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sessions. At the first session, the experimenter places a copy of the 
written story and two illustrations on the table in front of the subject, 
and says : 
Now, it's time to listen to a story of a person with a big 
problem, and the person doesn't know what to do about it. So, 
lots of people are giving the person advice. It will be your 
job to give me your opinion about whether the advice is good, 
pretty good, pretty bad, or bad. When I say bad advice, I 
mean that it doesn't make sense, or the ideas aren't complete, 
in your opinion. You can look at some pictures or read along 
while we listen. Let's hear this person's problem. 
At this point, the experimenter turns on the tape recorder and plays 
the tape. Then, the experimenter removes the written story and pictures, 
and places the choice chart, containers with chips, and pile of advice 
statements in front of the subject, and says: 
I'm going to read outloud ten different pieces of advice for the 
person in the story. I'll read one at a time, and you can show 
me your opinion by putting a colored chip on each card, then 
pushing it to the side of the table. You might think some state­
ments are good, some are pretty good, some are pretty bad, and 
some are bad. You decide. If you can't decide right away, we 
can always come back to it. I'd like you to pay attention to the 
reasons for the advice. 
The experimenter reads each advice statement outloud while the sub­
ject reads along, silently. The subject responds to each advice statement 
by placing a chip on the card. After the subject has responded to all 
ten statements, the experimenter says; 
Now, let's look at these again. Are there any you would like 
to change, or do you feel pretty sure? 
When the subject indicates that s/he is finished, the experimenter 
thanks the subject and escorts him/her from the room. 
At the second, third, and fourth testing sessions the experimenter 
follows the same procedure. However, the instructions are shortened to 
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reminders about hearing a story, giving opinions, and using the colored 
chips. 
The responses are scored and coded by assigning numbers to corres­
pond to the opinions of the subject (1 = bad, 2 = pretty bad, 3 = pretty 
good, 4 - good). The numerical scores for the pairs of advice statements 
representing similar moral stages are added together. The resulting data 
consist of five scores for each testing session. The score sheet is in­
cluded in Appendix K. 
In summary, the research instruments include: 
two manual puzzles 
40 easy crossword puzzles 
40 difficult crossword puzzles 
timer 
pencil 
four typed stories 
cassette tapes of stories 
tape recorder 
eight drawings 
40 advice statements 
choice chart 
48 chips in four containers 
40 score sheets 
written instructions 
Procedure 
The first steps in the procedure involved selecting instruments and 
writing the research proposal. Permission for using children in the re­
search was obtained, in April 1979, from the university committee on 
the use of Human Subjects in Research (Appendix L). 
Subjects were contacted from four sources. As soon as parental per­
mission was obtained (Letter to Parents in Appendix M), a child was as­
signed to one of four groups. The experimenter attempted to include 
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children from each source and both sexes in the four groups. As shown 
in Tables 1 and 2, the groups are not identical in terms of sex and source. 
but they are of equal size. 
Table 1. Number of s ubjects in four groups by source of subjects 
Source of Groups^ 
subjects 1 2 3 4 
4-H Club 4 3 4 2 
Parochial school 2 3 2 4 
Public school 
teacher 2 0 1 2 
Acquaintances 2 4 3 2 
^n = 10 in each group. 
















The general design was a Graeco-Latin Square design (Kirk, 1968). 
In order to use this design it was necessary to have equal numbers of 1) 
versions of the Moral Advice Test, 2) testing sessions, 3) tasks (puzzles) 
for a situationally induced affect, and 4) groups of subjects. 
The Graeco-Latin Square design (Kirk, 1968) permitted the isolation 
of three nuisance variables: groups of subjects, order of testing ses­
sions, and versions of the Moral Advice Test. The independent variable 
of interest was the different tasks, which were assumed to induce positive 
or negative affect. Each of the independent variables had four levels, 
and interactions were assumed to be zero. Kirk suggested rules for ran­
domization of Latin Squares. For the 4x4 Latin Square, "select one of 
four standard squares at random. Randomize the order of rows and columns 
of the standard square independently" (Kirk, 1968, p. 154). This proce­
dure was followed to set up a Latin Square. A Graeco-Latin Square De­
sign consists of two superimposed orthogonal squares. Squares are 
orthogonal to each other if every letter of one square occurs once and 
only once with every letter of the other square. The second Latin Square 
was balanced to be orthogonal to the randomly selected square. The re­
sulting design is shown in Figure 1. 
The ten children in each of the four groups received the same se­
quence of tasks and stories. Based on the design illustrated in Figure 
1, it was determined which subject would receive which puzzle, and which 
moral story (version of the Moral Advice Test), in each testing session. 
This is outlined in Table 3. 
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A 
1 ClOl C4D4 C3D3 S°2 
^2 C,D2 C1O4 C2D3 C4D1 
S C2»4 S»! C4D2 C1D3 
*4 C4O3 S°1 1^°2 
A = groups of subjects 
B = order of testing sessions 
C = tasks for situationally inducing affect 
D = versions of the Moral Advice Test 
Figure 1. Experimental design 
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Table 3. Tasks and stories for groups of subjects 
Order of testing session 
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n = 10 for each group. 
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Data collection 
There were two experimenters involved in administering the tasks and 
stories to each child. Both were female adults. One experimenter tested 
the 11 children from the parochial school, and the other experimenter 
tested the other 29 children. 
Each child was tested individually, four times. The 11 children 
from the parochial school were tested in a simple, spare room located in 
the adjoining convent. The other 29 children were tested in a research 
room in the Child Development Department. Both testing rooms were fur­
nished with tables and chairs and the research apparatus. 
The number of days between the subjects' first and last testing ses­
sions ranged from 1 to 19 days, X = 5 days. All but six of the subjects 
were tested with two sessions per day, for two days. When a subject was 
tested twice in a day, a break time was allowed which lasted approximately 
15 minutes. During the break, each child was invited to play with a min­
iature racing car game. This game was selected because it took only a 
few seconds to demonstrate, could be operated by either one or two people, 
could be interrupted at any time, and allowed each child to have a posi­
tive experience between testing sessions. 
At the beginning of the first testing session, the experimenter said; 
I'll be meeting with you four times for this project. We might 
meet on four different days, or a couple of times in the same 
day. Each time we meet I'm going to give you a puzzle to do 
and then we will listen to a story on the tape recorder. Then, 
I will ask you for your opinions about some advice given to a 
character in the story. I'll tell you more about that part 
later. You can ask me questions about this project and I will 
try to answer them. You are free to stop being involved at 
anytime. 
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The experimenter administered one of the puzzles and one of the 
versions of the Moral Advice Test, in each testing session. Each child 
was tested four times, and then debriefed after the last session. The 
children were informed that two of the puzzles were difficult and two were 
easy, and that the purpose of the study was to see if children have dif­
ferent opinions after experiencing difficult or easy tasks. 
The number of subjects completing the four different puzzle tasks 
in the present study is shown in Table 4. 





Difficult 7 33 
Easy 40 0 
Crossword 
Difficult 1 39 
Easy 35 5 
Data analysis 
The data were scored and coded by the experimenter. Repeated meas­
ures 4 (group) X 4 (sessions) x 5 (stages of moral judgment) analyses of 
variance were performed on the data. In the analyses, groups of subjects, 
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which differed in the sequence of task and story experiences, served as 
the between-group variable. Sessions, which differed in puzzle tasks, 
and stages of moral judgment served as the within-group variables. The 
dependent variable was responses to the Moral Advice Test. 
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RESULTS 
The null hypothesis for the present study stated that there would be 
no difference in children's moral judgments after experiencing difficult 
puzzles and after experiencing easy puzzles. The hypothesis was statis­
tically tested by the session x stages of moral judgment interaction. 
This interaction was not significant, F(12,432) = .88. Therefore, the 
null hypothesis failed to be rejected. 
Of secondary interest, was the trend in the children's overall re­
sponses to the Moral Advice Test. Advice statements representing lower 
level moral reasoning were generally rated lower than advice statements 
representing higher level moral reasoning. The difference in these rat­
ings was statistically tested by the main effect due to stages of moral 
judgment. This main effect was highly significant, F(4,144) = 38.72, 
2. < .01). The trend is illustrated in Figure 2. 
w 8 
 ^good  ^








 ^ bad 
g pretty 4 
I  ^
1 2 3 4 5(P) 
STAGES OF MORAL JUDGMENT 
Figure 2. Overall mean ratings of advice statements 
representing different stages of moral 
judgment 
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In addition, both the session x group interaction, and the session 
X group X stages of moral judgment interaction were highly significant; 
F(9,108) = 5.34, £ < .01, and F(36,432) = 2.32, £ < .01, respectively. 
These significant effects are conglomerate effects of the three nuisance 
variables of the Graeco-Latin Square Design. The conglomerate effects 
may have been influenced by the order in which the subjects were tested, 
or the differences in groups, or the differences in the four versions of 
the Moral Advice Test. While the interactions are significant, they have 
no bearing on this particular study, so no further analyses were conducted 
on these interactions. 
Subjects showed highly significant individual differences. This is 
shown in the main effect due to child/group, F(36,432) = 6.62, £ < .01. 
This result indicates that the measurement procedure was reliable. In 
addition, the interactions of session x child/group, and stages x child/ 
group were highly significant; F(108,432) = 2.30, £ < .01, and F(144,432) 
= 1.62, £ < .01, respectively. These interactions indicate that not all 
the children responded the same way to the different testing sessions 
and the different moral advice statements representing the five stages 
of moral development. 
The entire analysis of variance summary table is shown in Table 5. 
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Table 5. Analysis of variance summary table for the dependent variable 
of moral judgment 
Source df MS 
Group 3 19.47 2.26. 
Child/group 36 8.61 6.62 
Session 3 .82 .05. 
Session x group 9 15.97 5.34: 
Session x child/group 108 2.99 2.30 
Stages 4 81.69 38.72 
Stages X group 12 1.18 .56, 
Stages X child/group 144 2.11 1.62 
Session x stages 12 1.14 .88, 
Session x stages x group 36 3.02 2.32 





The major hypothesis was not supported in the present research. 
Older children's moral judgments did not vary as a function of different 
puzzle task experiences. This result is in contrast to the body of re­
search which indicates that moral behavior varies as a function of situ-
ationally induced affect (Isen, 1970; Berkowitz & Connor, 1966). How­
ever, the instrument selected for measuring moral judgment appears to be 
sensitive to children's moral judgments. Failure to demonstrate the in­
fluence of situationally Induced affect on moral judgment may be explained 
in terms of either methods or theory. Both methodological concerns and 
theoretical implications will be discussed, followed by suggestions for 
future research. 
Methodological Concerns 
The puzzles which were selected for the present study appeared to 
be appropriate. Most of the time the children did not complete the diffi­
cult puzzles but did complete the easy puzzles, as shown in Table 4. In 
addition, it was useful to have both manual and crossword puzzles for the 
purpose of comparing types of tasks. The difficult crossword puzzle 
appeared to be more challenging than the difficult manual puzzle, and the 
easy manual puzzle appeared to be simpler than the easy crossword puzzle. 
Yet, even though the experimental situations usually resulted in the pre­
dicted experiences of success or failure, it is not clear whether or not 
the children felt strong positive and negative emotions during the 
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testing sessions. 
In selecting methods for situationally inducing negative affect, 
the researcher was limited by a concern for placing subjects at risk. Ex­
periences with difficult puzzles may not have been challenging enough to 
result in strong negative feelings of frustration. However, the children 
may have been at risk if the study involved the induction of more con­
troversial negative feelings as depression, anger, or jealousy. Regard­
less of which method is selected for inducing negative affect, future re­
search should include a measure of the subject's feelings. The measure­
ment should occur immediately after the negative situation. It could be 
either an attitudinal measure or an observation of the subject's behavior. 
Inclusion of such a measure might resolve the question of whether or not 
children feel strong positive and negative emotions, as a result of ex­
perimental manipulations. 
Assuming that strong negative affect can be situationally induced, 
the question still remains as to whether or not the affect influences 
moral judgment. In the present study, two details in the procedure may 
have inhibited the detection of the influence of the puzzle situation. 
The first detail related to the fact that an adult experimenter was 
present during the entire testing sessions. Isen, Horn, and Rosenhan 
(1973) found that older children's moral behavior (generosity) differed 
as a function of the presence or absence of an adult experimenter, during 
the time when the children failed on difficult tasks. Children were more 
generous after failing in public than after failing in private. The re­
searchers concluded that perhaps the children wanted to save face in the 
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eyes of the adult. A similar self-consciousness may have been present 
in the subjects in the current study. It is possible that if the chil­
dren were embarrassed they may have suppressed their negative feelings 
of frustration. 
The second procedural detail of concern related to time. The min­
utes that passed between the end of the time allowed for completing the 
difficult puzzle and the moment when the child began responding to the 
Moral Advice Test may have served as a cooling-off period. During that 
period, the child passively listened to instructions and a moral story. 
If the child had felt frustration when the timer bell rang, it may have 
subsided by the time s/he was actually called upon to make moral judg­
ments. 
The method selected for measuring moral judgment had several 
strengths and weaknesses. In addition to satisfactorily meeting the cri­
teria for selection of the instrument, the Moral Advice Test appeared to 
be sensitive to eleven-year-olds' moral judgments. The significant main 
effect due to stages of moral judgment indicated that the children re­
sponded differently to statements representing different moral stages. 
The fact that the trend was generally linear (Figure 2) provided support 
for Kohlberg's (1969) theory of moral development. A possible weakness 
in the moral measure was that the four versions may not be equivalent. 
The present study controlled for variability by treating the versions 
of the measure as a nuisance variable. Further analysis of the differ­
ences between versions was not conducted. Due to the fact that ses­
sions interacted significantly with several other variables, there was 
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an indication that the versions were not equivalent. In addition, the 
researcher observed that during the debriefing sessions, several individ­
ual subjects mentioned preferences for specific stories. Perhaps, future 
research could involve a focus on whether or not the four versions are 
similar enough to be comparable. 
Theoretical Implications 
A theoretical explanation for the results of the present study is 
that even though affect influences moral behavior (Isen, 1970; Berkowitz 
& Connor, 1966), it does not influence moral judgment. The way children 
judge a hypothetical situation may be quite different from the way they 
spontaneously behave. Since the present study was a controlled experi­
ment, the results could be considered as evidence for the difference in 
the natures of moral judgment and moral behavior. In speculation, perhaps 
the development of moral judgment is slow and stable, while the acquisi­
tion of moral behavior is relatively quick and fluctuating. This concept 
extends Selman and Jaquette's (1977) theory of social cognition. Selman 
and Jaquette stated that some aspects of the child's personality are stable 
while some oscillate, but they did not make the distinction between judg­
ment and behavior. 
The results of the present study had an additional implication for 
theory. The main effect due to child was significant, implying that 
there are individual differences in the children's responses to the 
Moral Advice Test. Perhaps children vary in their sensitivity to the 
stress involved in trying to complete difficult tasks. This variation 
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may be reflected in their moral judgments. Meyer and Noble (1958) found 
that adults who score high on an anxiety test respond differently to 
stressful situations compared to adults who score low on an anxiety test. 
In addition, the present researcher observed that several children re­
sponded in distinctive patterns after struggling with the difficult tasks; 
for instance, some children rated every advice statement as "good". Based 
on Meyer and Noble's finding, and the observation and results of the pres­
ent study, it seems likely that the influence of situationally induced 
affect on moral judgment may vary as a function of children's individual 
differences in temperament. Theories of moral development have not 
included a consideration for individual differences in temperament. 
Future Research 
In conclusion, future research in the area of affect and moral devel­
opment should address several important issues. First, the degree of af­
fect, which is assumed to be situationally induced, should be measured 
immediately and directly. Second, both moral judgment and moral behavior 
should be included as dependent variables in a controlled study, in order 
to compare the influence of the affect. Third, individual differences 
in temperament should be considered as an independent variable. Fin­
ally, a few methodological issues need to be considered; Presence of 
the experimenter during testing, timing of the procedure, and differ­
ences in various stories in the Moral Advice Test. 
If these issues are resolved, perhaps the influence of affect on 
moral judgment will be better understood. 
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APPENDIX A: ILLUSTRATION OF MANUAL PUZZLES 
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APPENDIX B: EASY CROSSWORD PUZZLE 
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ACROSS DOVN 
1. the sound that a snake makes 
4. the day in between yesterday 
and tomorrow 
6. it has four walls 









2. in the near future 
3. what people call you by 
5. it rhymes with to 
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APPENDIX C: ENTIRE CROSSWORD PUZZLE FROM THE DES MOINES 
SUNDAY REGISTER 
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00' .jgoaa •••••••• 
•go ddag •••• ••aa 
aQoaBoaaqmnBOOQaao 
gaaoBi |as„uga 
aaaoQ ••••QQ Baaaoa 
laaaS oaBoo oBoB aama 
iqoQQQ oaaaoQ ••naa 
ana Bcia ogoQa 
BOBUuauouuwBumMuuuuui 
ooga DQQa QooQ aanaa 
aaoaaoQ oaoa ' oooo 
aanaci nogo •••• uaa 





;.'ntire crossword puzzle from 
Des koines Sunday Register. 
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APPENDIX D: DIFFICULT CROSSWORD PUZZLE 
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1 . automobile trim 
5. what nomads do 
6. the rainiest month 
7. sports event 
DOV;N 
1. study hard 
2. Rhode Island motto 








APPENDIX E: ORIGINAL MORAL ADVICE TEST 
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Story 1 
HEINZ Am THE DRUG 
In Europe a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. 
There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was 
a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently dis­
covered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging 
ten times what the drug cost to make. He paid $200 for the radium and 
charged $2000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, 
Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only 
get together about $1000, which is half of what it cost. He told 
the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper 
or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered 
the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So Heinz got desper­
ate and began to think about breaking into the man's store to steal 
the drug for his wife. 
Should Heinz steal the drug for his wife? 
Yes, he should steal it. 
No, he should not steal it. 
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Item 1 
You should steal the drug because you love both your wife and 
children. Saving the life of your wife and of a mother la much 
more Important than a druggist losing a little bit of a drug. Of 
course, people feel bad about losing money or being robbed, but 
think of what it does to children to lose their mother. 
I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good 
enough reasons for making this important decision. 
I tend to reject these reasons, They do not seem to be 
good enough reasons for making this important decision. 
I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
Item 2 
If you help your wife now, you can count on her to help you out if 
you ever get into trouble. And, even if she never saves your life, 
she could probably help you in a lot of other ways. So, you really 
would not be losing anything by helping her. 
I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good 
enough reasons for making this important decision. 
I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be 
good enough reasons for making this important decision. 
I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
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Item 3 
You can't let somebody die like that. It's your duty to save her. 
But you can't just go around breaking laws and let it go at that. 
You must pay the druggist back and you must take your punishment 
for stealing. 
I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for 
making this important decision. 
I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good 
enough reasons for making this important decision. 
I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be 
good enough reasons for making this important decision. 
I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons 
for making this Important decision. 
Item 4 
If you take the drug, you really can't be blamed. The druggist should 
have helped you. A druggist is supposed to be in business to help 
people, not to let them die. 
I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for 
making this important decision. 
I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough 
reasons for making this important decision. 
I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be 
good enough reasons for making this Important decision. 
I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
76 Item 5 
You are only doing this out of love. It is only natural to steal 
to save someone you love. 
I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for 
making this Important decision. 
I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good 
enough reasons for making this important decision. 
I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be 
good enough reasons for making this Important decision. 
I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
Item 6 
If you don't take the drug, you are going to be all alone. It would 
be stupid not to steal because you want your wife and because the most 
they could give you would be a short jail term. Jail is no fun, but 
it wouldn't bother you that much if it were only for a short time. 
I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for 
making this important decision. 
I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good 
enough reasons for making this important decision. 
I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be 
good enough reasons for making this Important decision. 
I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons 
for making this Important decision. 
77 Item 7 
Where the choice must be made between disobeying a law and saving a 
human life, the higher principle of preserving life makes it morally 
right—not just understandable—to steal the drug. 
I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for 
making this Important decision. 
I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough 
reasons for making this important decision. 
I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be 
good enough reasons for making this Important decision. 
I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons 
for making this Important decision. 
Item 8 
If you let your wife die, you will get in trouble. You will be 
blamed for letting her die. Then there will be an investigation of 
you and of the druggist for your wife's death. 
I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for 
making this important decision. 
I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good 
enough reasons for making this important decision. 
1 tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be 
good enough reasons for making this Important decision. 
I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
78 Item 9 
You have to follow your conscience. Obeying the law is not as impor­
tant as doing what you think is right. A person has to live up to 
the values that he believes in. 
I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for 
making this important decision. 
I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good 
enough reasons for making this important decision. 
I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be 
good enough reasons for making this important decision. 
I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
Item 10 
You tried to pay for it first. You wouldn't do any other damage or 
take anything else, and the drug you would take is only worth $200. 
You are not really taking a $2000 drug. 
I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good 
enough reasons for making this important decision. 
I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be 
good enough reasons for making this important decision. 
I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons 




Ann took several pens and some money from a school secretary's purse. 
She spent the noney and threw away the pens. When she saw Gall, her 
best friend, she told her that she had something very serious and 
personal that she wanted to talk about. But, before she told Gall 
anything about the incident, she asked her for her promise not to 
tell anyone what she said. Gail agreed to keep everything she heard 
a secret. 
When the truth had been told. Gall was in a difficult position. She 
has given her word not to tell anyone, but she knew that until the 
thief was caught there would be no passes or special privileges for 
any students. Also, several Innocent students were suspected of 
having taken the pens and money. 
Should Gall tell someone that Ann took the pens and money? 
Yes, she should tell someone. 
No, she should not tell anyone. 
80 Item 11 
If you don't tell someone before Ann gets caught, then you will be 
punished too. Ann will be caught soon anyway. If you help a thief, 
you will be punished. You might even be accused of the theft. 
I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good 
enough reasons for making this important decision. 
I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be 
good enough reasons for making this important decision. 
I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
Item 12 
When a law is broken it is every person's duty to help by finding 
the person who broke the law and by reporting them to the proper 
authority. The sooner you tell someone, the sooner Ann will be able 
to face the proper punishment and pay for her theft. The property 
of each person should be protected, or everyone's property Is in 
danger. 
I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for 
making this important decision. 
I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough 
reasons for making this important decision. 
I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be 
good enough reasons for making this important decision. 
I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons 
for making this Important decision. 
81 Item 13 
There is nothing that Ann can do for you that will ever pay you back 
for keeping such a troublesome secret. If you tell the truth now, 
other students will appreciate the fact that you were the one who 
got the passes and privileges returned to them. 
_______ I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good 
enough reasons for making this important decision. 
I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be 
good enough reasons for making this important decision. 
I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
Item 14 
You have to decide what you think a really fair person would do in 
this situation. If you don't tell anyone, you will be leaving Ann 
in a very uncomfortable position. Considering what is fair and what 
you would think would be best for anyone in her situation, your best 
action is to let someone know. 
I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons 
for making this Important decision. 
I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good 
enough reasons for making this important decision. 
I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be 
good enough reasons for making this Important decision. 
I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
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Item 15 
If you explain what your problem is to your parents or to a teacher 
or counselor, they will help you. You won't really break your pro­
mise by asking someone what you should do about this situation. Ann 
will understand better this way and your action will certainly have 
the approval of your parents and teachers. 
I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good 
enough reasons for making this important decision. 
I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be 
good enough reasons for making this important decision. 
I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
Item 16 
If you tell the authorities, they will give you a reward for having 
come forward with the truth. Your punishment will be severe if you 
keep such a big crime a secret. 
I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough 
reasons for making this important decision. 
I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be 
good enough reasons for making this Important decision. 
I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
83 Item 17 
If you let one person get away with one theft, they may go on to 
steal more things. If you don't help keep the law you will be help­
ing those who would ruin the law and order of our country. You can't 
think of just your friend. It Is best for everyone If thieves are 
reported and punished. 
I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good 
enough reasons for making this Important decision. 
I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be 
good enough reasons for making this Important decision. 
I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
Item 18 
It will be too painful to keep the Information secret. If you tell 
someone now they will praise you for your truthfulness. Besides, 
this friend is in big trouble. She is more likely to cause you trouble 
than she is to help you. 
I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons for 
making this important decision. 
I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good 
enough reasons for making this important decision. 
I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be 
good enough reasons for making this important decision. 
I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons 
for making this Important decision. 
84 Item 19 
You must decide for yourself what Is right and good. Obeying laws 
is not as Important as obeying your conscience. If you must break 
your promise to live up to the values you believe In, then that Is 
what you should do. 
I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons 
for making this Important decision. 
I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good 
enough reasons for making this Important decision. 
I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be 
good enough reasons for making this Important decision. 
I re.iect these reasons. They are not good enough reasons 
for making this Important decision. 
Item 20 
A nice person can't protect a person who did something like this. 
Your other friends and the adults you respect expect you to do the 
right thing In this situation. They will approve of your action 
and will understand why you could not keep your promise. 
I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good 
enough reasons for making this Important decision. 
I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seen to be 
good enough reasons for making this Important decision. 
I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons 




Fred wanted to publish a mimeographed newspaper for students so that 
he could express many of his opinions. He wanted to speak out about 
major problems in the United States and against some of the school's 
rules. 
Fred was a very good student, a student council representative, and 
a winner of a speech contest concerning, "VJhat America Means to Me." 
When Fred started his newspaper, he asked his principal for permission. 
The principal said it would be all right if before each publication 
Fred would turn in all his articles for approval. The principal 
approved all of them, and Fred published two issues of the paper in 
the next two weeks. 
But the principal had not expected that Fred's newspaper would receive 
so much attention. Students were so excited by the paper that they 
began to organ {r-vi protests against two school rules about which Fred 
had written. Fred's friends urged htm to print more issues of his 
paper. Angry p.Kents cbjcctcd to Fred's opinions. !rt\ey phoned the 
principal teliTug. him the newspaper was unpatriotic and should not be 
published. 
As a result of the rising excitement, the principal ordered Fred to 
stop publishing. He gave as a reason that Fred's activities were dis­
ruptive to the operation of the school 
Should Fred continue to write and hand out newspapers? 
Yes, he should continue. 
No, he should not continue. 
86 Item 21 
You don't have to obey the principal if you don't want to. If it 
Is more important to you to publish your paper, then go ahead and do 
it. But, the principal may suspend you. 
I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good 
enough reasons for making this important decision. 
I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be 
good enough reasons for making this Important decision. 
I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
Item 22 
The principal should only stop you if you are taking away someone 
else's rights. People who don't like your idea have the right to 
publish their ideas. 
I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good 
enough reasons for making this important decision. 
I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be 
good enough reasons for making this important decision. 
I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
87 Item 23 
If you publish another edition of your newspaper> nothing bad will 
happen. The principal won't tear up your papers or hurt you. 
I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough 
reasons for making this Important decision. 
I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be 
good enough reasons for making this important decision. 
I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
Item 24 
You won't do any damage by publishing your newspaper. If other 
students make trouble by protesting about rules, they will be 
punished. You are a good student and had the principal's approval. 
You won't be punished. 
I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good 
enough reasons for making this important decision. 
I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be 
good enough reasons for making this important decision. 
I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
88 Item 25 
The principal gave you his word that it would be all right. People 
should not break a promise just because it is difficult to keep it. 
I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough 
reasons for making this important decision. 
I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be 
good enough reasons for making this important decision. 
I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
Item 26 
Your friends have helped you publish your newspaper. You won't be 
a good friend if you turn your back on them now. The people who 
really matter know you are a good student working towards good goals. 
I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good • 
enough reasons for making this important decision. 
I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be 
good enough reasons for making this Important decision. 
I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
89 Item 27 
The principal must consider all points of view, but he must not 
take orders from one group. Just because the principal is head 
of the school doesn't permit him to take away your rights. 
I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons 
for making this Important decision. 
I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good 
enough reasons for making this Important decision. 
I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be 
good enough reasons for making this important decision. 
I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons 
for making this Important decision. 
Item 28 
Consider all the work you put into starting up the paper. You would 
be throwing It all away If you stop now. Even if you keep publishing, 
the principal probably won't do much to you. 
I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons 
for making this Important decision. 
I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good 
enough reasons for making this Important decision. 
I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be 
good enough reasons for making this Important decision. 
I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons 
for making this Important decision. 
90 Item 29 
You feel badly about the principal's problems, but you will feel 
much worse about letting your friends down. As long as you have 
your friends' support you should publish. 
I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good 
enough reasons for making this important decision. 
I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be 
good enough reasons for making this important decision. 
I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
Item 30 
You really have the right to publish your paper. The principal 
shouldn't change his rules because of some noisy people's protests. 
You can't allow a school or a country to be run by a noisy few, 
I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good enough 
reasons for making this important decision. 
I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be 
good enough reasons for making this important decision. 
I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
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Story 4 
In a war zone, a company of Marines was outnumbered and retreating. 
The company had crossed a bridge over a river, and the enemy was 
still on the other side. If someone went back to the bridge and blew 
it up as the enemy was coming over it, it would weaken the enemy. 
With the head start the rest of the men in the company would have, 
they could probably escape. But the man who stayed back to blow 
up the bridge would probably not be able to escape alive; it would 
be most likely that he would be killed. The captain of the company 
has to decide who should go back. He asks for volunteers, but no 
one will volunteer. Finally, the captain decided to order one of 
the men. to stay behind. He ordered a man who had been a trouble­
maker to stay and blow up the bridge. The man was strong and 
courageous, but he did not know whether or not to follow the order. 
Should the soldier obey the captain's order to go back and blow 
up the bridge? 
Yes, he should obey. 
No, he should not obey. 
92 Item 31 
Your responsibility is to stay with the other men of your rank. 
The officer is the one with the duty to stay and save his men. 
He must be willing to give his life for his men. 
______ I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons 
for making this Important decision. 
I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good 
enough reasons for making this important decision. 
I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be 
good enough reasons for making this Important decision. 
I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons 
for making this Important decision. 
Item 32 
When you have to make hard decision like this you have to go by 
what you really think Is right. You can only disobey an order when 
you know the order is not right. 
I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good 
enough reasons for making this important decision. 
I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be 
good enough reasons for making this Important decision. 
I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons 
for making this Important decision. 
93 Item 33 
What have these men ever done for you that is worth your taking 
such a risk? What could they do for you even if you manage to 
live? It would be stupid to obey. 
I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good 
enough reasons for making this Important decision. 
I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be 
good enough reasons for making this important decision. 
I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
Item 34 
If you stay behind you will be the only one left to fight the enemy. 
There is a good chance you will be caught and beaten or killed. 
I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good 
enough reasons for making this important decision. 
I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be 
good enough reasons for making this Important decision. 
I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
94 Item 35 
The officer might not like it if you don't stay, but your friends 
and your mother and father will approve of your attempt to get home 
to help them. You must be brave enough to say "no" to the officer. 
I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good 
enough reasons for making this important decision. 
I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be 
good enough reasons for making this important decision. 
I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
Item 36 
A man or a group of men have no right to say one life is worth more 
or less than any other life. All men are created equal. The right 
to life is more important than what any captain says. 
I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons 
for making this Important decision. 
I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good 
enough reasons for making this important decision. 
I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be 
good enough reasons for making this important decision. 
I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
95 Item 37 
Even though you are called a troublemaker, you are basically a good 
person. The captain might not feel badly if you are killed, but 
you have many friends at home who would feel very sad. 
I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good 
enough reasons for making this important decision. 
I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be 
good enough reasons for making this Important decision. 
I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons 
for making this Important decision. 
Item 38 
Nobody wants to die when they are young and healthy. It would be 
foolish to stay and die. You want to live as much as any of the other 
soldiers. 
I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good 
enough reasons for making this Important decision. 
I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be 
good enough reasons for making this Important decision. 
I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons 
for making this Important decision. 
96 Item 39 
If you stay behind you might get captured. When you are captured 
the enemy will torture you or shoot you. You will suffer. 
I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons 
for making this important decision. 
_______ I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good 
enough reasons for making this Important decision. 
I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be 
good enough reasons for making this Important decision. 
I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons 
for making this Important decision. 
Item 40 
Even though the captain Is In charge. It Isn't part of his duty 
to leave someone to die. You should obey a captain's orders, but 
not for something like this. 
I accept these reasons. They are good enough reasons 
for making this Important decision. 
I tend to accept these reasons. They seem to be good 
enough reasons for making this important decision* 
I tend to reject these reasons. They do not seem to be 
good enough reasons for making this Important decision. 
_____ I reject these reasons. They are not good enough reasons 
for Baking this Important decision. 
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APPENDIX F: ILLUSTRATION OF CHOICE CARD 
GOOD PRETTY G*OOD 
THEY ARE GOOD 
ENOUGH REASONS 
FOR MAKING THIS 
IMPORTANT DECISION. 
THEY SEEM TO BE 
GlOOD EN0U6H REASONS 






THEY DO NOT SEEM 
TO BE GOOD EM0U6K 
REASONS FOR MAKINS 
THIS IMPORTHNT DECISIOM 
THEY ARE NOT 
GOOD ENOUGH REASONS 
FOR MAKING; THIS 
JMPOI?TANT DECISION. 
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APPENDIX G: EXAMPLES OF COLORED CHIPS 
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APPENDIX I; REVISED MORAL ADVICE STATEMENTS 
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irewi I, 
YoO SHOULD STEAL THE DRUG BECAUSE 
You LO\;E BOTH VÔOR WIFE AND 
CHIlbREfA. SAVING- "THE UFE OF VOUR 
WIFE Al^ D OF A MOTHER IS MUCH MORE 
IMPOI^ TAMT THAW A DRUGGIST LOSING A 
LITTLE BIT ÛF A X>ROG. OF COURSE,FEOPlf 
FEEL BAD A60UT LOSII^ G MOMEV OR 
B0tt& 1?0&6Et>, 60T TMlMK ôF WHAT IT 
t>oEs TO CHILDREN to LOSE THEift 
MOTWÊR.. 
8TEK Z -
IF yoo HELP yooR WIFE NûyJ, you 
CAN COUMT ON MER -R> HELP VOU OUT 
IF yoO ever GET iMTO TROUBLE. AWt> 
ËNiEN IF SHE NEVER sAVES VOUR LIFE, 
YOUR, WIFE CoULb PROBftBLY HELP VOO 
IM A LOT OF OTHER WAYS, SO, VOU 
REALLY WOULD) MOT SE LOSIMCS- ANYTHING 
BY HELPING VOUR WIFE. 
109 
ITEM 3. 
you CAN'T LET SOMtBOOy DIE 
LIKE THAT. IT'S YOUR bUTV TO 
SAVE VOUR WIFE. BUT VOU CANT 
JOST <sO AROUND BREAKING LAWS 
Atib LET IT 60 AT THAT VOU MUST 
PAY TWE PROG SI ST SACK AMl> VoU 




If you TAKE THE DMfr, VOU REALLY 
CAM'T BE BLAMEb. THE MOôtf'IST 
SHOULt> HAVE «ELPEt» VOU. A bgU66IST 
IS SOPPOSEb' T6 6E IM BUSINESS T® 
HEtP PEOPLE, HOT TO «-CT "MEM blE. 
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ITEM 5. 
voo ARE OI^ LV t>Oir^G THIS OUT 
OF LOVE. IT IS OMUV MftTDRftL 
TD STEAL Tb SAVE SOMEONE 
VOL) LOVE. 
ITEM (c. 
IF you CsoriT TAKE THE DROÔ, VOU ARE 
&01M6 Tb 6E ALL ALONE. IT WûULb BE 
STUPID NOT "TO STE"AL BECAUSE YOU 
WA»)T yooft WIFE" AWt> BECAUSE THE MOST 
-ntEY CO0L& &IVE you wouub BE A SHO(?T 
OftlL TERM. -JAIL IS NO FUN, BUT iT 
moulon't bother you t»at much if 
IT vjERE ot>JLY For A short time. 
Ill 
7. 
(AirtSRt THE CHOICE" MOST BE MftbE 
BETlAiEEf^  DISOBEY) 1^6- A LAW AMb 
SAVING A HOMAM LIFE  ^ "THE 
PRINCIPLE OF peESERVIMG- LIFE /V)AKES 
IT jVliOR-AULV R\S'KT—NOT OOST UN5ER 
STftMI>A6L£~ "TO STEAL THE DRO .^ 
z .  
iF VoU LET YOUR WIFE WE, VOO 
WILL eET IX TROOBLC. VOU WILL 
6e BLAMEt) FbR UETPNA HER NE. 
THEM -TXERE WILL 6E AM 
iNVESTIâATlOrt OF YOU AWb ûF 




VOO HAME Tt) FbLLOl*! VOUR CONSCIEAlCE. 
OfeeV/Mfr TME LAW IS MÛT AS 
IMPORTANT AS bO<W6 WHAT VOO 
THINK *5 RKS-HT. A PERSOfJ WAS 
Tb LIVE uP TO THE VALOE-S THAT 
HE feEUEV/ES IN. 
item 10. 
VoO TRiEb "TO fAV FbR IT FiRST. yoo 
WOULDN'T DO AMY toTHER DAMAGE OR 
TAKE AMYTri)K<3- ELSE, AMD THE DRUS-
you wJûOlD TAKE IS oNLY WORTW 
$2O0. yoO ARE NOT REALLY T7VK1KJ<S-
A ^2.,ÛOO DRU (Sr. 
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ITEM II. 
,F you BOM'T TELL SOMEONE BEFORE 
ANN 6ETS CAIXSrHT, THEN VOU WILL 
BE pUNlSHEb -no. ANN WILL BE 
tAUôHT SOÛM AMVW/vy. IF YOU MELt> 
ft THIEF, YOU WILL BE P0W1SHE£>. 
you MIGHT EVEN BE ACCUSEt. oF 
THE THEFT, 
ITEM 12. 
WHEN A LAW IS BROKEN IT IS EVERY 
PERSON'S Dury TO MELP BY F)|JC>IW<S-
THE PERSOfi UlMO BROKE THE LAW ANC> 
ÔY REPoRTINâ- THEM T£> THE PROPER 
AUTHOR IT/, THE SOONER YOU TFLL SOMEDME  ^
THE SOONER ANN WILL BE ABLE TQ FACE 
THE PROPER PUNISHMENT AMC> PAY FBR 
HER THEFT. THE PROPERTY OF EACH 
PERSOM SHOUL£> BE PROTECTEB  ^ OR 
EVERYONE'S PROPERTY IS IN DAN<SER. 
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4TEM 13. 
THERE IS MOTWINfr TMflT ANN CAM bo 
FÔR YOU THAT WILL EVER PAY YOU 
BACK R>R KEEPlWa SOCH A IROOBLESOME 
SECRET. IF you TELL TMG mOTU NOW, 
OTHER SnJbeMTS WILL ftPPftEClATE THE 
fftCT THAT VOO WERE THE ONE WHO 
GOT T»E PASSES AMk PRWILRiE'S 
RETURNED TT> THEM. 
ITEM 14-, 
yoo HAVE TO tecibe WHAT you twink A 
REALLY fair person WOOLb bO IN THIS 
SITUATION. IF VOU bONt TELL ANYONE, VOU 
WILL 66 LEAVING ANN IN A VERY ON-
COMFORTABLE POSiTIO^i. COMSlbERlNô WHAT 
IS FAIR AND WHAT YOU WOULb TTJlNK 
WOULD 6E BEST FOR ANYONE IH HER 




iF VOU WHAT YOUR PROBLEM IS 
TD VOOR PARENTS OR Tb A TEACHER OR 
COONiSEUOR,THeV WILL HELP VOU. YoO 
WOnV REALLY BREAK VouR PROMISE BY 
hSKlN6 SOtAEONE WHAT YoU SHOULb bO. 
WILL UNBERSTAND., AN£> VOOR 
ACTION WILL CERTWNLY HAVE THE 
APPROVAL OF youft PARENTS ANb 
TEACHERS. 
ITEM Kfi. 
IF YOU -TC'LL THE AUTHORITIES  ^
THEV'T-L GIVE YOU A REWARB R)R 
COMING FBRUIFTRB WITM THE TRUTTI. 
VOOR POMISHI^ ENT WILL BE SEVERE 
IF YOU KEEP THE STEAL I NG- A 
SECRET-
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\Ç  VoO LET AMM GET AWAY WlT« " 
ONE TMEFT, SHE MAY 60 ON lb STEAL 
MOPE tMlW6-S, IF VoO DONT HELP 
KEEP TME LAW, VOO WILL BE HELPW6 
TWOSE WHO WOULD RO;M TME UW AWb 
()RDGR oF 00ft iiooMTiey. vou dAMT just 
TRl^ lK OF VOOR FRiEMb. iT iS BEST 
fbP. EMBRVOWE IF tmEVES^ LIKE 
ARE REPORTEt» /VMb puNlsHEb. 
ITEM IS. 
\r WILL BE -TOO PAINFUL "TO KEEP 
ANM'S STCADWSr A SECRET IF VOU 7EU. 
SOMEDME NOW THEV WILL PRAISE VOU 
fbR. VOUR TROTHFUIMESS. BESIDES  ^ ANM 
IS llA 616 TROUBLE. SHE IS MORE 
UKELV TD CAUSE VOU TR006LE THAM 
sue IS Tb HELP you. 
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ITFM M. 
YOO MOST DEClbE FOR YOUR SELF 
WHAT IS RISKT fthib (SOOb. olSE-yiNCr 
LAWS IS MOT AS IMPORTAIT AS 
oeeyiNô VOOR o^Aiscie/oce. IF VOO 
MUST BREAK yoOR PROMISE TO LIVE 
OP tt) THE VALUES VoO RELIEVE lH, 
1HE»i TMAT iS WHAT VOO SHOOLfc- E>0, 
/ fieri P O .  
ft filCE PERSO») CAMT PROTECT 
A  ? E R S O l ^  b t b  S O M E T H l W é -  L I K E  
STSALIKIG. YOUR OTHElR FRiEMbS AMI> 
-THE ftbULTS YOO RESPECT EXPECT YOU 
-to bO THE <?16MT TH1M6, THEY'LL 
A P P R O V E  O F  Y O U R  A Û T 1 0 H  A W b  W I L L  




you DOM't  HAVE TO OBEY THE 
PRINCIPAL IF you DON'T WANT "TO, 
IF IT IS MORE IMPORTANT TO yOU 
TO PUBLISH yoUR PAPER, THEN Go 
AHEAD AND t>0 IT, BUT, THE 
PRINCIPAL MkY 5USPENi£> VOO. 
ITEM 2 Z .  
THE principal shoulc» only stop 
you iF you ARE TAKIN& AWA/ 
SOMEONE ELSE'S RIGHTS. PEOPLE 
WHO D>ONY LIKE YOUR IDEA HAVE 
THE RIGHT TO PUBLISH THEIR 
O W N  IDEAS, 
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ITEM 23. 
\f VoO PUBUSH AtlOTMEl^ ElilTIOM 
Of yooR ^^E^^lSPiftPelR, NOTHING- SAD 
WILL HAPPEN.  THE"  PRINCIPAL WONV 
tear up Vouf t  PAPERS Of t  HURT 
VOU. 
ITEM ZH. 
you WOhi'T DO Al^ V DAMAGE By 
PUBLISHVOOR |OEUiSf=i f tPER. IF 
O-MCI5 STUC>EN^TS MAKE TROUBLE EY 
PROTESTII^ Ô ABOUT RULES, THEV'LL BE 
PUNlSHetï. VOO'RE A fiOOD STUEseNT 
HAD -mg PRihiClPAL'S APPROVAL. 
VoU UiOhiT BE PUNISHED). 
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ITEM Z5. 
PRIMCIPAL GAVE YOO HIS 
VKHORB THAT IT WOULD BE ALL 
RI6UT. PE-OPUE SHOULB'MT GRFAK 
ft PROMISE JUST BECAUSE IT 
IS DIFFICULT "TO KEEP |T, 
ITCH 2(ff. 
YOUR FRIEMDS HAVE HE^LPEb YOU PUBLISH 
YOUR NEWSPAPER. YOU WON'T BE A GOOD 
FRiENb IF YOU TURtJ YOUR BACK ON 
THEM NOW. THE PEOPLE WHO REALLY 
MATTER KNOW YOU ARE A G-OOD 




THE PRINCIPAL MOST CONSIDER ALL 
POINTS OF VIEW, BOT HE MOST NOT 
TAKE ORDERS FRohA ONE S-ROUP, 
JO ST BECFTUSE THE PRINCIPAL J S 
HEAB OF TME SCHOOL DOES NT 
PERMIT HIM TO TAKE AWAY YOUR 
RIGHTS. 
ITEM 28. 
CONSIDER ALL THE WORK YûO POT 
INTO STARTING UP THE PAPER. YoO 
WOULD e.E THROWING IT ALL AWAY 
IF YOU STOP NOW. EVEN IF VOU 
KEEP PUBLISHING^ THE PRINCIPAL 
PROBABLY WON'T IX) MUCH TZ) YOU, 
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ITEM 
YOU FEEL BADLY ABOUT THE TRlMClTftL's 
PROBLEMS, BUT YOU WILL FEEL MUCH WORSE 
ABOUT LETTlNfr YOUR FKlENDS DOWN. 
ftS LONG- AS YOU HAVE YOUR FRIENDS' 
SUPPORT YOU SHOULD PUBLISH. 
ITEM 30, 
YOU REALLY HAVE THE FIGHT TO 
PUBLISH yoUR PAPER. THE PRINCIPAL 
SHOOUDN'T CHANGE H>S RULES 
BECAUSE OF SOME NOISY PEOPLE'S 
PROTESTS. YOU CAM'T ALLOW A 
SCHOOL OR A COUNTRY Tb BE 
RUN By A NOISY FEW. 
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ITEM 31. 
YOOP RgSPOMSlBlUTy IS TO STAV WITH 
-niE OTHER lAED OF YOOR RANK. THE 
OFFICER IS THE ONE WITH THE bOTV 
TD STAY AWb SAVE HIS MEN. HE 
MOST BE WILLING TO &l\lE HIS 
LIFE FbR HIS MEM-
t-TTEM 32. 
vOHeM "VOO ARE HAVIM6- A HARl> "OWE 
t>eClt>lM6 WHE-mER OR MOT Tt) OSEV 
the OFFICER, VOO HAVE TD GrO 6y 
WHftT VoU REW-tV THINK IS RISMT. 
VOO CAN OMLV OlSoBEV AN ORbEl? 
WHEM VOU KNÙUJ TME ORbEIg 
IS NOT RIGHT. 
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ITCM 33. 
WHAT HAVE THESE MEN EVIER t>OHE 
FbR VoO THAT IS WORTM VOUR 
TAKIMÛ- SOCH A RISK? WHAT 
COOLb THÊV DO Fb(2 yoO EVEN 
|p yoO MANAGE "TO LIVE? Il~ 
UlOOLt> &e STOPlb Tb OBEY. 
ITFM 34. 
IF VOO STftV feEHIMb yoO WILL BE 
THE OMUy OWE LEFT TO F»6HT THE 
Et)ElAf. THEfi-E IS A <SOût> CHAMCE 
yoO WILL BE CA06HT AMb BEATEM 
OR KILUEt>. 
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ITtM 3S .  
TVte OFFICE'R MKsrtT WÛT LIKE IT IF 
yoo tsOM  ^ STAY, SOT VoOft FRlEMbS 
ftMD VOUR mother AMb FATHER (A)ILL 
approve OF yoOR ATTEMPT" It) GET 
HOWE "rt» HELP TTiEM, VOO MOST BE 
BRAVE EN006H Tb SAY "NO" TO THE 
OFFICER. 
ITEM 36. 
A MAM OR A EFTOOP OF MEM HAVE 
MO R\6HT 11) SAV ÛKJE UFE 
WORTH MDRE OR LESS TWAM A MY 
OTHER LIFE, ALL MEM ARE CREATED 
EQUAL. THE R16HT TT> LIFE IS MORE 




EVEN TH006M yOO frftE CALLEb fit 
troublemaker^ yoO are eASlCALLV 
A GOOb PERSOM, THE CAPTAIM 
MIGHT NOT FEEL E-ftDUV IF YOU 
ARE KILLED, BUT VOU HAVE MANY 
FRIEMC>S AT HOME WHO WOOLb 
FEEL VERY SAt>. 
ITEM 3 d .  
NOBODY WANTS TO b>E WHEN "HIEV 
ARE VoONCr ANt> HEALTHY. IT MOULb 
BE FOOLISH Tb STAY AiOb biE. 
YûO WANT TO LIVE AS MUCH ftS 
ANY OF TXE OTHER SOLblERS. 
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ITEM 31. 
IF VOU STAY BEH/MO VOO /V1I6HT 
GET CflP7V/?Et. mBN "iOO'RE Ct\PTUR&> 
THB ENEMY W/IL TbRTME VOO 0/6 
SHOCT you. J/OU WLL SOFFBlS. 
ITEK 40. 
EMEK -MOO^RT THE CAPTAIN IS IN 
CHARGE, IT IS»^T PART OF MIS BOTY 
-FB UEAME SOMEOMG TO T>\E. YOO SHOUU> 
osev A CAPTA/M'S ORBERS, BUT NOT 
FÔR SOME%WM& LIKE THIS, 
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STAGE REPRESENTED 3Y STATEMENT 
Stage Item Stage 
Represented Number Represented 
3 21 2 
2 22 P 
4 23 1 
4 24 1 
3 >5 4 
2 26 3 
P 27 P 
1 28 2 
P 19 3 
1 30 4 
1 31 4 
4 32 P 
2 33 2 
P 34 1 
3 35 3 
1 36 P 
4 37 3 
2 38 2 
F 39 1 
3 40 4 
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APPENDIX K: SCORE SHEET 
J-Ji 
WEHNEH»S RESEARCH DATA 
Child's name Researcher 
Group number: A^ ^2 H ^ 4 Child's age Child's sex_ 
Session : 
PUZZLE: Type: E-manual, D-manual, E-crossword, D-crossword 
Performance: complete incomplete 







PUZZLE: Type: E-manual, D-manual, E-nanssword, D-crossword 
Performance: complete incomplete 







PUZZLE: Type: E-manual, D-Manual, E-crossword, D-crossword 
Performance: Complete incomplete 







PU&ZLE: Type: E-manual, D-manual, E-crossword, D-crossword 
Performance: Complete incomplete 







APPENDIX L: PERMISSION FROM THE HUMAN SUBJECTS RE­
SEARCH COMMITTEE 
lOV^JSTATE UNIVERSITY 
(Pleas* follow the accompanying Instructions for completing this form.) 
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IJ Title of project (please type): Affect and Moral Judgment in Older Children 
2J I agree to provide the proper surveillance of this project to Insure that the rights 
and welfare of the human subjects arc properly protected. Additions to or changes 
in procedures affecting the subjects after the project has been approved will be 
submitted to the committee for review. _ ^ 
Sonia Soneson Werner April 1 979 
Typed Named of Principal Investigator Date Signature of Principal Investigator 
Child Development 294-3040 
Campus Address Campus Telephone 
Signatures of others (If any) Date Relationship to Principal Investigator 
Major Prpfefiflor 
4J ATTACH an additional page(s) (A) describing your proposed research and (B) the 
subjects to be used, (C) indicating any risks or discomforts to the subjects, and 
(D) covering any topics checked below. CHECK all boxes applicable. 
rn Medical clearance necessary before subjects can participate 
I I Samples (blood, tissue, etc.) from subjects 
I 1 Administration of substances (foods, drugs, etc.) to subjects 
I I Physical exercise or conditioning for subjects 
Pn Deception of subjects 
|%1 Subjects under 14 years of age and(or) Q Subjects 14-17 years of age 
I I Subjects In Institutions 
I I Research must be approved by another institution or agency 
5J ATTACH an example of the material to be used to obtain Informed consent and CHECK 
which type will be used. 
Fl signed Informed consent will be obtained. 
n Modified Informed consent will be obtained. 
Month Day Year 
Anticipated date on which subjects will be first contacted : ApcjJ— ] 979 
Anticipated date for last contact with subjects: ^ ^ ^ 
If Applicable: Anticipated date on which audio or visual tapes will be erased and(o 
Identifiers will be removed from completed survey Instruments: 
Sh i)if ^  
6.J SIgnature/6f Head or Chairperson Date Department or Administrative Unit 
•• / V /: 7/ , • 
9y DecFsTon of the ÛnFversfty cômmfttee'ôn thê~Ûsë~ôf"HÛmân"sûbJëcts"ïn"RësëârchT 
Project Approved Q Project not approved []] No action required 
Georae G- Karas 
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APPENDIX M: LETTER TO PARENTS 
Technology ||j ( i f  S d e n r e  a n d  Antes. Iowa 50011 
ChilU Development Depanmcnt 
101 Child Dcvelopmeni Building 
Telcphone 51 ) 294-3040 
Dear Parents, 
I am a graduate student in Child Development at Iowa State University, 
in Ames. For my dissertation research, I am studying older children. 
I am interested in how children of the same age vary in judging the 
values that story characters must consider when facing serious life 
problems, such as death and stealing. I am also interested in seeing 
if the. judgments children make relate to the way they solve problems, 
particularly crossword and manual puzzles. 
I would like to use your child in this research project. The procedure 
would involve your child meeting with ne or my assistant four times. 
Each time we meet, the child would work on a puzzle and then loQk 
at a story and give opinions about the story characters. Your chlla 
will probably uewd about twenty minutée for each session, and the-
sessions will occur in the Child Development Building. I would be willir 
to help with transportation. It is àcceptâble to me to schedule more 
than one of your child's sessions in a day, on a Saturday or late 
afternoon. 
Your child will be told that any questions about the study will be 
answered, and they may withdraw from participating at anytime. Your 
child's performance on the puzzles and opinions about the stories will 
be held confidential. No one except me and my research committee will 
see individual responses. Since my research interest is in children 
in general, names will be removed from all our records by September 197S 
I need to have your permission, in writing, to'involve your child.in 
this research project. Please fill out the form below and return it 
in the stamped, self-addressed envelope that is provided for you, I 
would appreciate it if you could return this by . 
If you do grant me permission, I will be in touch with you soon, by 
phone, to arrange times and transportation. 
Thank-you for your cooperation, 
Sonia Soneson Wemey, Ph.D. Candidate 
Damaris Pease, Distinguished Professor 
I grant permission for my child to be a subject in 
Werner's research project. 
Signature of Parent Date 
Phone Number 
